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The world around us has increasingly become integrated through the emergence of
globalized trade and technology. My thesis lies on the intersection of international
trade, macroeconomics and development and evaluate the implications of these
increased interconnections and market institutions like-change in intermediaries
or network structure. My work connects theory with detailed micro or country-
level datasets to provide quantitative answers to these questions. I would now
detail the two broad themes of my work:
Trade and Intermediaries
Gains from Agricultural Market Reform: Role and Size of Interme-
diaries: To what extent is agricultural output/efficiency limited by the non-
competitive market structure in developing countries? And to what extent does
market structure hinders intra-national trade within these countries? The recent
work in quantitative trade literature has highlighted that the size of intra-national
trade barriers is quite high and reduction of these barriers will lead to large welfare
gains. It is fairly difficult to quantify the size of these intra-national trade barriers
and it is even more challenging to identify their source- is it lack of infrastructure,
information friction or inter-mediation (market structure)? The trade literature
often uses spatial price gaps between different regions as a way to estimate trade
costs, but since there are many factors generating this gap it does not allow to
separately identify the contribution of intermediaries to these costs.
To circumvent these problems, I exploit a quasi-natural policy experiment, which
changed the market structure in agricultural markets in one of the states in India.
Prior to this policy change, the number of traders on local agricultural markets
were fixed by the government. But after policy change the markets allowed free
entry of traders. In order to estimate the welfare gains from this policy change,
I build a Ricardian style comparative advantage model of intra-national trade in
i
ii
agricultural crops with an additional layer of intermediaries. Using the model, I
first derive an estimation equation based on no arbitrage condition which allows me
to identify the change in margin charged by intermediaries, which also puts a lower
bound on the size of intermediary markups. Since the market reform shifted only
the market power of the intermediaries, while being orthogonal to other domestic
frictions, a simple difference-in-difference (DD) strategy allows me to recover the
size of margin charged by them. To implement this strategy I use daily-level farm-
gate price data from these markets. In the case of groundnut, one of the major
crops in Karnataka, I estimate 16% change in the intermediary margin due to
this policy change. I then connect the model with rich micro datasets on land
use and farm productivity to estimate other relevant parameters of the model to
run counter-factual experiments. Under the assumption that the reform changes
intermediary margin by 16% across crops and farmers can change their cropping
decisions, I find that the policy change will lead to an average of 1.3% increase in
welfare across regions. This is a significant welfare increase given that policy only
impacts crops which account for 9% of the total state GDP.
This study is important because it highlights the important role of market struc-
ture in determining intra-national trade costs in developing countries, specially
in the agricultural markets. This paper adds to the growing literature on in-
termediation in trade, where trade is conducted via intermediaries rather than
by producers themselves. Finally, it shows that substantial welfare gains can be
achieved through intra-national trade by reducing market power of these inter-
mediaries. Understanding the role of market structure for trade is an important
theme and I will continue to explore it in future research.
Network Structure and Input-Output Linkages
Shock diffusion: Does network structure matter? The aggregate economy
is a dynamic system generated by interaction of various economic units. Can
these micro units interact to generate aggregate fluctuations is an old debate in
economics? Absent any interaction between sectors, the law of large number ar-
gument ensures that idiosyncratic shocks would die on the aggregate level. The
recent literature in macroeconomic networks is trying to overturn this result by
accounting for amplification of idiosyncratic sectoral shocks through sectoral inter-
connections. This study is important for at least two reasons. First, from a toolkit
perspective, incorporating network features in macroeconomics both theoretically
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and empirically is a challenging task. So, it is important to know whether network
structure matters and pin down the key characteristics. Second, if it really mat-
ters, it would generate new insights for business cycle literature due to increased
understanding about how sectoral shocks can generate aggregate fluctuations.
Building on the recent work on this topic, (see Acemoglu et. al. (2012)), I intro-
duce the concept of diffusion of shocks in a multi-sector economy through produc-
tion frictions. I show that since sectors have different production horizons it leads
to slow diffusion of idiosyncratic shocks and hence lower amplification of shocks
on the aggregate level. This result is different from other recent papers which have
single period models with contemporaneous production linkages and can generate
aggregate fluctuations through sectoral shock amplification. I further argue that
once we account for this diffusion rate, it is no longer sufficient to characterize
the contribution of network structure to aggregate volatility by looking at sum-
mary statistics like degree distribution of the input-output matrix. I connect the
model to the data by using lead time indicator from manufacturing as a proxy
for diffusion rates of different sectors. In the end, I use factor models to get the
contribution of aggregate and sector level shocks in aggregate volatility of US man-
ufacturing sector. I find that contribution of sectoral shocks in case of diffusion
adjusted network model is the same as that of a model without any network and
much lower than standard network models without any diffusion. This result is in
sharp contrast with other network papers which highlight higher contribution of
sectoral shocks to aggregate volatility after accounting for amplification through
production networks.
Employment in a Network of Input-Output Linkages (joint with Fran-
cois de Soyres): What is the consequence of a technological improvement in one
sector on employment in sectors located downstream in the supply-chain? On the
one hand, if material and labor are gross substitute in the production function,
the price decrease for the former tends to reduce labor demand for the latter per
unit produced. On the other hand, the upstream positive technological shock also
increases the number of unit produced through a decrease in the marginal cost.
The net effect on employment simply depends on the ratio between the elasticity
of substitution in the production function and the price elasticity of demand.
While a positive technological shock to an upstream sector will always increase
production or output in its downstream sector, labor employed can go up or down
depending on two key parameters- the substitutability between intermediate inputs
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and labor and price elasticity of its demand.We estimate those parameters at the
sector level using detailed French data and show that employment sensitivity of
sectors following a decrease in their material input price are very heterogeneous.
Consequences for forecasting the effect of an increase in machine efficiency are
discussed.
Abstract- French
Le monde qui nous entoure est de plus en plus intégré via la mondialisation des
échanges commerciaux et de la technologie. Dans ce contexte, ma thèse se situe à
l’intersection du commerce international, de la macroéconomie et de l’économie du
développement et s’attache à évaluer l’impact de cette augmentation des intercon-
nections et des structures de réseaux qui l’accompagnent ainsi que les institutions
qui lui sont attachées. Mon travail fait le lien entre la théorie économique et les
données – micro-économiques ou au niveau des pays – afin de répondre à ces ques-
tions. Mes recherches peuvent être regroupées selon deux grands thèmes que je
développe ci-dessous:
Rôle des intermédiaires de vente dans le commerce
Les gains liés aux réformes du marché agraire : rôle et taille des in-
termédiaires de vente: Dans quelle mesure la production et la productivité
agricole sont-elles limitées par l’absence de marché compétitif dans les pays en
développement ? Et dans quelle mesure est-ce que les structures de marché
entravent le commerce intra-national à l’intérieur de ces pays ? La littérature
quantitative récente dans le domaine du commerce international a mis en avant
l’importance décisive des barrières commerciales à l’intérieur des pays et les poten-
tiels bénéfices que la société pourrait tirer de leur réduction. En règle générale, il
est difficile de quantifier précisément la taille de ces barrières intra-nationales ainsi
que d’identifier leur source – est-ce en premier lieu le manque d’infrastructure, les
frictions liées à l’information ou le rôle des intermédiaires de vente et de la structure
de marché ? Les travaux s’attachant à ces questions utilisent souvent les varia-
tions de prix observées dans l’espace pour recouvrer les coûts agrégés de transport,
mais ces derniers recouvrent de nombreux facteurs distincts et une telle méthode
ne permet pas d’identifier séparément la contribution des intermédiaires de vente
dans les coûts totaux.
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Pour dépasser ces problèmes, j’utilise une expérience quasi-naturelle via un change-
ment de politique publique conduisant à une évolution de la structure des marchés
agraires en Inde. Avant la mise en place de cette réforme, le nombre d’intermédiaires
de vente sur les marchés agraires locaux était fixé par le gouvernement, tandis
qu’après la réforme, l’entrée de nouveaux acteurs dans ce marché a été libéralisée.
Afin d’estimer les gains pour la société issue de ce changement de réglementation,
je construis un modèle théorique du commerce intra-national de biens agraires basé
sur les avantages comparatifs de type Ricardien auquel j’ajoute un rôle spécifique
pour les intermédiaires de vente. Dans un premier temps, ce modèle me permet de
formuler une équation d’estimation basée sur des conditions d’absence d’arbitrage
qui me permettent d’identifier la variation des marges des intermédiaires de vente,
ce qui établit en même temps une borne inférieure du taux de marge de ces in-
termédiaires. Le changement règlementaire impactant seulement le pouvoir de
marché des intermédiaires et étant orthogonal aux autres distorsions domestiques,
j’utilise simplement une stratégie de différence des différences (DD) pour recou-
vrer le niveau des marges chargés par ceux-ci. L’implémentation de cette stratégie
utilise des données quotidiennes pour les transactions opérées par les producteurs
à la sortie de leur exploitation. Dans le cas des arachides, l’une des cultures prin-
cipales de la région du Karnataka, mon estimation du changement de la marge des
intermédiaires s’élève à 16% à la suite de la réforme de la réglementation. Dans
un second temps, je fais le lien entre le modèle et les données micro-économiques
d’utilisation des sols et de productivité de exploitations afin d’estimer les prin-
cipaux paramètres du modèle et enfin de fournir des analyses contrefactuelles.
Prenant l’hypothèse d’une diminution des marges des intermédiaires de 16% pour
toutes les cultures et en permettant aux fermiers d’adapter leur choix de culture
sur leur sol, j’estime les bénéfices de cette réforme à 1, 3% du bien être agrégé pour
l’ensemble des régions. Une telle augmentation est particulièrement significative
au regard d’une réforme qui touche des activités qui constituent seulement 9% du
PIB total de l’état considéré.
Une telle étude est de première importance car elle met en lumière le rôle déterminant
des structures de marché dans les pays en développement, et en particulier en ce
qui concerne les marchés agraires. Ce travail contribue à la littérature en pleine es-
sor étudiant le rôle des intermédiaires dans le commerce national et international.
Finalement, ce travail montre que des gains substantiels de bien être peuvent être
atteints dans le commerce intra-national en réformant la structure des marchés et
ainsi le pouvoir des intermédiaires. La compréhension du rôle de ces structures
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est un thème de première importance et j’ai l’intention de poursuivre dans cette
voix pour mes prochains projets de recherche.
La structure des réseaux de production
Diffusion des chocs:quel est le rôle de la structure du réseau? L’économie
est un système dynamique dont l’évolution résulte de l’interaction de nombreuses
entités. Le rôle de chacune de ces entités microéconomiques individuelles dans
les fluctuations agrégées est un débat ancien en économie. Lorsque les secteurs
n’interagissent pas les uns avec les autres, la loi des grands nombres conduit à
l’effacement des chocs de chacune des entités qui n’ont ainsi pas d’impact indi-
viduel sur les agrégats économiques. La littérature récente en macroéconomie des
réseaux tente de dépasser ce résultat en prenant en compte les effets d’amplification
des chocs individuels pouvant résulter des liens de production entre entités. Un
tel travail est important pour deux raisons. D’une part, dans la perspective de
la production d’outils à l’usage des économistes, la prise en compte de ces effets
de réseau en macroéconomie théorique et empirique constitue un challenge impor-
tant. En ce sens, il est primordial de savoir si la structure précise des réseaux
de production peut avoir un impact important sur les agrégats économiques et si
tel est le cas quels sont les caractéristiques à prendre en compte. D’autre part, si
de telles structures sont importantes, cela pourrait générer des avancées nouvelles
dans l’étude des cycles économiques et permettre une meilleure compréhension du
lien entre fluctuations sectorielles et agrégées.
Mon travail s’appuie sur les dernières avancées dans le domaine de l’étude des
réseaux (Acemoglu et al. (2012)) et introduit le concept le concept de diffusion des
chocs à travers les frictions de production dans une économie multisectorielle. Les
secteurs ayant différents horizons de production, la diffusion des chocs idiosyncra-
tiques est plus lente et moins sujette à des phénomènes d’amplification au niveau
agrégé. Ce résultat diffère de la plupart des études sur le sujet qui modélisent
une production uni périodique encourageant plus facilement l’amplification et où
les liens de production conduisent les chocs sectoriels à impacter les fluctuations
agrégées. De plus, mon travail montre que lorsque le temps de diffusion est pris en
compte, les métriques simples développées par la littérature pour rendre compte
de la capacité d’un réseau à générer de la volatilité agrégée, telle que la moyenne
des degré sortant (weighted outdegree) ne sont plus suffisantes. Le modèle est
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ensuite relié aux données en utilisant les indicateurs lead time pour le secteur man-
ufacturier comme reproduction du retard (ou avance) de propagation. Finalement,
à l’aide d’un modèle de facteur, j’isole la contribution du secteur manufacturier
dans la volatilité générale de l’économie américaine et montre que la contribution
des chocs sectoriels dans un réseau avec diffusion retardée est équivalente à celle
trouvée dans un modèle sans réseau, c’est-à-dire très faible comparée aux modèles
de réseau à production contemporaine. Ce résultat établit un contraste important
avec de nombreux papier traitant des réseaux de production qui mettent l’emphase
sur e rôle important des fluctuations sectorielles dans la volatilité agrégée à travers
les liens de production.
Emploi dans un réseau de production (co-écrit avec François de Soyres):
Quelles sont les conséquences d’une innovation technologique dans un secteur sur
le niveau d’emploi des autres secteurs situés plus loin dans la chaine de production.
D’une part, si le travail et les facteurs intermédiaires de production sont substituts,
alors une réduction de prix de ces derniers tend à réduire la demande pour le
travail pour chaque unité produite. D’autre part, une innovation technologique
dans secteur situé plus haut dans la chaine de production conduit à produire un
plus grand nombre d’unités car le cout marginal de production décrôıt. L’effet
total sur l’emploi dépend simplement du rapport entre l’élasticité de substitution
de la fonction production et de l’élasticité de prix de la demande agrégée.
Ainsi, alors qu’une innovation technologique dans un secteur situe plus haut dans
la chaine de production a inévitablement des effets positifs sur le niveau de pro-
duction, l’effet sur l’emploi est plus nuancé et dépend des deux paramètres clefs
que sont l’élasticité de substitution entre les emplois et les biens intermédiaires
ainsi que l’élasticité-prix de la fonction de demande totale. Nous estimons ces deux
paramètres pour un grand nombre de secteurs avec des données micro-économiques
françaises. Les résultats montrent des sensibilités très différentes entre les secteurs.
Nous discutons enfin les conséquences de cette hétérogénéité pour les prévisions
sectorielles de l’automatisation.
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Chapter 1
Gains from Agricultural Market
Reform: Role and Size of
Intermediaries
Abstract
How does market structure and the presence of intermediaries impact the cropping pattern
and agricultural trade within a country? The difference between farm-gate and consumer
prices implies large intra-national trade costs but it is difficult to know the contribution of
intermediary margins to these costs. This paper exploits a pro-competitive policy reform
from India, that allowed free entry of intermediaries in the agricultural markets, to quantify
the size of these margins. I develop a Ricardian style comparative advantage model of
intra-national trade in agricultural crops, which embeds intermediaries and is suitable for
this study of market structure change. The model gives a structural equation that allows
me to estimate the change in intermediary margin due to this reform. I find that post
reform the intermediary margin decreased by 16% for Groundnut, one of the major crops
in this region. I then connect the model with rich micro datasets on farm productivity
and land use to estimate relevant parameters to run counter-factual experiments which





Recent work in the quantitative trade literature has highlighted the importance of
intra-national trade barriers. The welfare gains from the removal of these intra-
national trade barriers are found to be as large or even larger than the gains from
removing international trade barriers in the case of developing countries. Another
important feature of these countries is their dependence on agriculture. Since a
significant part of their population is dependent on agriculture1, the performance
of agricultural markets and policies has a direct impact on their livelihood and is
a crucial component of poverty reduction programs.
While lack of physical infrastructure, adverse geography and market integration
are common barriers to trade in these agricultural markets, scant attention has
been paid to the presence of intermediaries and market structure in these coun-
tries, which can potentially have a huge impact on how different regions within
these countries trade and what they trade2. While there has been some work on
understanding the role of intermediaries, there is a gap on the quantitative side
of the literature to assess the role of intermediaries, specially in the agriculture
sector (see Atkin and Donaldson(2016)). It is already difficult to characterize the
size of these intra-national trade costs, and it becomes even more challenging once
one decides to break down these costs into different components such as lack of
infrastructure, information friction or inter-mediation.
To circumvent the problems associated with any such empirical exercise, I use a
quasi-natural policy experiment from India to estimate the margins charged by
intermediaries on local agricultural markets and put a lower bound on the inter-
mediation costs. The policy reform involved moving from a system with fixed
number of government mandated intermediaries to a system with free entry of
intermediaries. The reform was initiated in the beginning of February 2014 in
the state of Karnataka in India and has been sequentially rolled out in different
markets.
Other papers in the trade literature use spatial price gaps to put an upper bound
on the size of trade costs between regions, but it lumps together the various factors
1Agriculture contributes roughly 20% to Indian GDP and around 65% of population is still
rural according to 2011 census.
2Other than trade, there is large literature in development which points towards large surplus
cornered by middlemen in developing countries.
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contributing to this gap, e.g. trade costs and markups. In contrast, this paper
leverages a natural experiment on market reform to directly measure the size of
these costs associated with market power of intermediaries. A unique dataset
containing daily farm-gate price data allows me to recover the margins charged by
intermediaries on these markets. The presence of price data both before and after
the policy is the crucial factor in determining the impact of this policy change.
An important contribution of my paper is to use this high frequency price data
from India. Previous papers either did not have the necessary data available or
they did not exploit this feature of the data.
Using the minimal condition of price arbitrage across different regions, a com-
mon result in trade models, gives me a simple estimation equation to pin down
the change in intermediary margin, which also corresponds to the lower bound
of their market power. Since the market reform shifted only the market power,
while being orthogonal to other domestic friction, a simple difference-in-difference
(DD) strategy allows me to recover the size of the margin charged by these in-
termediaries. The daily price-data both before and after implementation of the
policy allows me to control for market level unobserved heterogeneity by using the
panel dimension of the data. In the case of groundnut, one of the major crops in
Karnataka, I estimate this intermediary margin around 16%.
The remaining part of the paper then deals with evaluating the long run welfare
impact of this policy change. I develop a Ricardian style comparative advantage
model with multiple crops and multiple regions, with an added layer of inter-
mediation on trade. The farmers grow multiple crops on different plots of land,
which vary in quality. The average quality of land varies across regions as well as
crops, thus giving comparative advantage to a given region in certain crops. Dif-
ferences in land quality across regions, thus generate crop specialization, a regular
feature of Ricardian style models. Farmers sell their crops to the intermediaries,
who then sell it on the local, domestic and international markets. In case of trade,
there exists transporters who charge transportation cost over and above the trader
margins and ship the goods. The first important difference relative to standard
trade models is that farmer choices are based on farm-gate prices in the region,
which is different than the consumer prices in the same region. Since other papers
do not deal with intermediaries, they use the same prices for both farming and
consumer decision. However in my case, this difference is crucial as it generates
a wedge between between farmer and consumer choices. In the end, I close the
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model by assuming that the economy acts as a small open economy and takes
foreign prices as given.
The second difference relative to existing trade models is in the way I embed the
intermediaries, who charge a fixed margin over and above the farm-gate prices.
I do not have data on number of intermediaries before and after the reform, but
the modelling choice circumvents this problem by capturing market power as a
function of this margin charged by the intermediaries. The change in market
structure leads to a change in the margin charged by these intermediaries, which
gives an estimation equation for change in market power.
To quantify the model, I then combine data from different sources on Indian agri-
culture. The agricultural data consists of crop choices, production, land allocation
and productivity across different regions and crops. The iceberg trade costs across
different Indian districts are generated from the dataset prepared by Allen and
Atkin (2016) on Indian highways and freight rates. Finally, I use disaggregated
household level consumption data to estimate the elasticity of consumption across
crops.
The market structure with fixed number of intermediaries is a common feature
in agricultural markets all across India and the counter-factual analysis involves
assessing the welfare impact of this policy if the restriction on number of interme-
diaries is relaxed across all these markets.
After estimation of relevant parameters, I use my model for evaluating two counter-
factual scenarios under the assumption that the reform changes intermediary mar-
gin by 16% across a set of crops. Under the first scenario, farmers are not allowed
to change their output decisions post market reform. This can be thought of as
a short term response where farmers stick to old cropping pattern but change in
market structure changes their incomes through changes in trade. The second
counter-factual scenario gives freedom to farmers to change their cropping pattern
in response to market reform. This scenario highlights the presence of misallo-
cation across crops due to market structure. Under this scenario, I find that the
policy reform will increase the average welfare by 1.3% in these regions. While
there are negligible gains in the first case, the second scenario delivers heteroge-
neous but positive welfare gains for most regions. Since the set of crops affected
by this reform accounts for approximately 9% of total GDP, the welfare gains from
change in policy are sizable.
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This paper is connected to a large body of literature on the size of intra-national
trade costs, agriculture and inter-mediation. The most important contribution of
the paper is in understanding the role of intermediaries and their size in intra-
national trade costs. One strand of this literature looks at gains from trade under
variable markup charged by the producers (see Melitz and Ottaviano (2008); Feen-
stra and Weinstein (2010); Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu (2011)). But here the focus
is more on market power of producers rather than intermediaries.
The other and more closely related stream of literature explicitly models interme-
diaries and comes in two different shades. In case of Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei
(2011) and Antràs and Costinot (2011) intermediaries act as trade facilitators.
The intermediaries in these models help in breaking into new markets (usually
foreign) and are important for trade. On the other hand Chau, Goto, and Kanbur
(2009) model intermediaries as middlemen who earn excessive profits in develop-
ing country markets, which is closer to the setting in this paper. In this case,
intermediaries hurt local trade by charging high markups. Atkin and Donaldson
(2015) come closest to the paper and they use detailed micro-data to quantify
the share of intra-national trade costs which can be attributed to the presence
of intermediaries. The main difference with their paper is that while I estimate
a lower bound on the surplus captured by the intermediaries, they put an upper
bound (since intermediaries might be playing an important role in supply chain
by providing storage facility etc).
The theoretical model presented in the paper is similar to the studies on trade
and agriculture literature (see Costinot, Donaldson and Smith (2016); Costinot
and Donaldson (2011); Sotelo (2016)). All these papers use Ricardian style com-
parative advantage model of trade with crop choice and then use it to quantify
welfare impact under counter-factual scenarios like climate change or improved
infrastructure. My modelling choice is driven by the absence of intra-national
trade data, which is usually present in the case of international trade. Thus it
is similar to Sotelo (2016), who too uses information on land use data instead of
trade for quantifying the model. The modelling innovation here is the inclusion
of intermediaries in a tractable way which gives a direct method to evaluate the
change in market power post policy reform.
More broadly, the paper also connects to the work on inefficiency in agriculture,
mainly by Gollin, Lagakos, and Waugh (2013), Gollin and Rogerson (2014) and
others. This paper highlights another source of inefficiency, which can arise due
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to high margins charged by the intermediaries, thus impacting overall trade and
comparative advantage in developing countries. Lastly, the paper is also related
to the work on telecommunication infrastructure and market performance (see
Jensen(2007); Aker(2010); Steinwender(2015)). These papers too exploit a natu-
ral experiment, the expansion of mobile networks or telegraph, to study changes
in price discovery mechanisms. In contrast, this paper focuses on estimating in-
termediary margins rather than changes in price dispersion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the agricultural
market in India and the associated policy reform. It also gives reduced form evi-
dence for increase in prices recieved by farmers due to this reform. Section 3 gives
the theoretical framework with intra-national trade in presence of intermediaries.
Section 4 describes the data used in the analysis. Section 5 explains the estima-
tion procedure as well as give the parameter estimates. Section 6 provides welfare
analysis under counterfactual scenarios. Section 7 concludes.
1.2 Agricultural Market in India and Policy Re-
form
The agricultural market in India is highly regulated through the institution called
Agricultural Market Produce Committee(APMC), which regulate the local agri-
cultural markets, both the number of markets as well as the number of intermedi-
aries active on each market. Historically, APMCs were constituted around 1960s
to support farmers and prevent their exploitation at the hands of money lenders
and local traders. Thus the state governments regulated agricultural markets
through APMCs, so that it can monitor marketing activities and help farmers get
fair price for their produce. Although, given restricted entry of traders on these
markets APMCs themselves evolved over time and became exploitative due to
excessive power to the intermediaries.
APMCs are controlled by the state governments, which divide each state into dif-
ferent geographical locations, which then constitute a local Mandi (or market).
Farmers are allowed to sell their produce only at their local government approved
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Farmers A Traders A
Farmers B Traders B Transporters Consumers
Figure 1.1: Market Structure: Before Integration
market and only to government approved traders 3. This setup reduces the flex-
ibility of the farmers and gives market power to the local intermediaries who get
their license renewed once every 5 or 10 years, depending on the state. Whole
sale and retail traders, even if they wish to, are not allowed to purchase directly
from the farmers. This restriction coupled with the fact that number of interme-
diaries on the market are pre-decided by the government, makes these markets
uncompetitive. Although, the local produce is sold off through auctions on these
local markets but given the small number of intermediaries, it is easier for them
to collude and suppress the prices paid to the farmers. The market power of these
intermediaries is reported as a big problem in the agricultural market and also
gets reflected in the big difference between retail vs farm gate prices paid to the
farmers.
Figure 1.1 describes the structure of the market before policy change. The markets
are segmented because farmers in market A are allowed to sell their only produce
to the intermediaries active in market A. Similar is the case for market B. The
number of blocks at each level represents the number of players on each level. So,
farmers are much more numerous than intermediaries, who form the second layer
3Although farmers can sell small amounts locally to each other in their village but big harvests
have to go through these markets. Thus, intra or inter-national trade in agricultural commodities
has to go through these markets due to restrictions imposed by the state. Also retail chains
are not allowed to directly procure from farmers but have to buy indirectly through the same
intermediaries. In 2012, Walmart was denied to sign a contract directly with the farmers, which
would have meant bypassing the APMCs.
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Farmers Traders Transporters Consumers
Figure 1.2: Market Structure: After Integration. The orange block corre-
sponds to the new traders due to free entry.
of this market. After buying from farmers, intermediaries sell their goods to other
wholesalers or retailers who form 3rd layer and I call them transporters in the
rest of the paper. They ship the goods around before selling them to the final
consumer. The number of transporters and final consumers are also larger than
the number of intermediaries, who are limited and fixed by the government.
1.2.1 Unified Market Platform: Karnataka
The state of Karnataka in South India has been a forerunner in agricultural mar-
ket reforms and has been taking advantage of modern technology to bring reforms
in the agricultural sector. The Unified Market Platform (UMP) is part of this
initiative to connect different agricultural Mandis in the state through an online
auction platform for agricultural commodities. The reform is called market inte-
gration because it brings together the intermediaries and farmers from different
markets. The scheme was formally launched on 22 February 2014.
The reform intends to develop a transparent and integrated e-auction mechanism
to connect farmers with intermediaries in order to improve competitiveness and
thus fetch higher prices for farm produce. Figure 1.2 represents the market struc-
ture in Karnataka post integration reform.
There are two immediate changes which can be seen from figure 1.2. All farmers
are now shown together under level 1, because they can technically sell their
produce to any intermediary on the online auction platform. The intermediaries
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in level 2 are now constituted by the old intermediaries, white blocks, plus the
additional intermediaries (in orange) who are added due to free entry condition.
The free entry of new traders is the most important block of this reform. Post
reform, given the ease of registration anyone with basic knowledge of internet can
register himself as an intermediary on this platform.
Currently, there are very few intermediaries who trade on multiple markets, which
essentially means that this market reform has increased the number of interme-
diaries on each local market, thus increasing the competitiveness for buying farm
produce. Given last estimates there were approximately 35, 000 intermediaries ac-
tive on some 100 markets. The other two layers i.e. 3 and 4 of transporters and
consumers are unaffected by this reform and would see no change 4.
Present Structure: Since the project is named Unified Market Platform, one
gets an impression that many intermediaries are trading on multiple markets at
the same time. But there are few traders active on multiple markets as came
out of discussions with the authorities who are implementing this program. The
main reason behind fewer traders active on multiple markets is that quality testing
facilities are not available on most markets. This means that online traders have no
way to find out the quality of the farm produce, without being physically present
on the market. During my visit to these markets in August 2016, only five markets
had such a quality testing feature.
Not only such quality labs are expensive to setup but the ones which have been
established are also not used by the farmers. Since the testing requires farmers to
part with a sample of their produce and most farmers are marginal, they prefer
to sell it without getting tested rather than lose part of their produce to testing.
Another reason for farmer disinclination to quality testing comes from the fact
that testing usually takes few days to a week and in most cases the farmer is not
ready to wait and is happy to receive the payment on same day.
This means that physical presence on the Mandi is essential for gauging quality
of the produce and an intermediary sitting hundreds of kilometres away on his
computer would not engage on the markets sans quality certificate. Even a big
trading firm which might think of getting active on multiple markets would need
physical presence on the markets it wants to buy from. Given this background, the
4Although this might change in long run as new supply chains will be formed to reflect the
changed market structure. Since this paper deals with short term changes, it is safe to assume
that the basic structure of layers 3 & 4 of remains unchanged
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Farmers A Traders A
Farmers B Traders B Transporters Consumers
Figure 1.3: Market Structure: After Integration. The orange block corre-
sponds to the new traders due to free entry.
unification of markets can be seen as an increase in the number of intermediaries
on each market due to free entry condition as represented in figure 1.3. The above
details support the assumption that this reform only changed the bargaining power
of the local intermediaries vis-a-vis the farmers. I will use this assumption both
in the model and estimation.
Market functioning: Farmers and intermediaries who want to sell/buy on the
market need to get themselves registered on the e-platform. Intermediaries who
want to be active on this market need to pay a nominal fee and keep some pledged
money or security with the platform. Once a market is integrated, all the inter-
mediaries on this market have to get themselves registered.
The farmers are still required to bring their crop to the local Mandi and cannot
directly enter into contract with others outside the Mandi. Once the farmer brings
the crop to the Mandi, each lot of the farmer is given an identification number
with physical parameters like weight, crop and variety at the entry gate of the
market.
Once the characteristics of the lot are determined it is put up for auction on the
e-platform with all details. The prospective buyers can bid for any of these lots till
the stipulated cutoff time, which is usually 3 pm in the afternoon after which the
bidding closes. After the auction closes, the winning bids are flashed on the local
market TV screens. The farmer also receives a message about the price for his lot
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on his mobile phone. Thereafter, the farmer is required to give his acceptance for
the bid price. In case he rejects the offer there is second round of auctions on the
same day which is executed in similar fashion.
Implementation details: The state of Karnataka has 155 major markets, out
of which some 71 were integrated till September 2015 and have been included
in the period of study. The roll out of reforms was not immediate and markets
were integrated on the unified platform over time. The coverage of the program
is shown in figure 1.5, which shows the distribution of integrated markets in the
state.
Figure 1.6 shows the rollout of the reform and gives the number of markets inte-
grated on the e-platform every month. The first three markets were integrated in
February 2014 and then the rest were integrated in waves, with maximum mar-
kets being integrated in November 2014. This paper covers markets which were
integrated till September 2015.
1.2.2 Reduced form evidence
Given the pro-competitive nature of policy reform described above, it is expected
that the farmers in the integrated regions will get higher farm-gate price for their
produce. Since all the markets did not get integrated at the same time, it allows us
to compare markets which did not get integrated against those which got integrated
and see if the farmers really got a higher price.
Before evaluating the gains to farmers from this policy, it is important to look at
the market characteristics of the integrated and non-integrated markets. There
were 71 integrated markets as of September 2015 and another 84 non-integrated
ones. The observable market characteristics are shown in table 3.1. The first level
gives the mean and standard deviation of annual expenditures of these markets.
The average spending of all the markets is equal to Rs 75.5 Million and there is no
significant difference between integrated and non-integrated markets. The other
observable characteristics annual income, number of villages covered and number
of traders active on each market are also similar for the two sets of markets. Also,
the median market size (not reported in this table) is also very close to the mean.
Given these figures, one can conclude that size characteristics do not govern early
selection of a market into this program. A logit regression for selection of markets
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into the program over market level observables gave insignificant coefficients on
market level observables, thus ruling out the possibility of selection of markets on
observables.
The most important parameter which changed post policy reform is the number
of traders on each of these markets. The integrated markets have on average
171 traders. Although, I could not get the number of registered traders on each
of these markets separately for post reform period, but the authorities informed
me that there were roughly 30, 000 traders registered on the UMP platform as of
September 2015. Since, all the previous traders had to also get registered on the
platform for trading, this gives an average of 257 new traders on each market.
This is more than 100% increase in the number of traders and enough to break
the market power of the previous intermediaries.
This policy reform should result in higher farm-gate prices for the farmers. To
test this prediction I use daily level farm-gate price data from June ’13-July ’15.
I show the impact of this policy on groundnut prices by running the following
regression:
Yit = β ∗ Integrationit + δi + νt + ǫit (1.1)
where Yit correspond to the price of groundnut in region i at time t. I observe
three moments of price in the data- mode, maximum and minimum, which are all
reported. The Integrationit variable captures the integration status of market i at
time t and is equal to 1 if integrated and otherwise 0. The specification in equa-
tion 1.1 underlines the difference-in-difference strategy because we are comparing
increase in farm-gate price of groundnut in integrated market after integration
vis-a-vis non-integrated markets, which act as the control group.
The panel dimension of the data allows us to control for the unobserved mar-
ket level heterogeneity, which otherwise might have caused the change in out-
comes. The identifying assumption here is that the only market characteristic
which changes post reform is the market power of intermediaries, which is cap-
tured by the Integrationit variable. The remaining market characteristics remain
the same and are filtered out by the term δi, the market fixed effect. The term νt
filters out the time fixed effects from the regression.
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The results from the estimation of equation 1.1 are given in table 1.2. Integration
results into an increase of Rs 148 in the modal price of 100 kg of groundnut, which
is approximately 4% of the average modal price of groundnut in 2015. The results
for all crops do not go into same direction. For example- there is no impact on
prices of maize, which is also reported in the appendix.
The next section will now outline the theoretical model which would be used for
deriving estimation equations and simulating the counter-factuals.
1.3 Theory
1.3.1 Environment
To study the impact of change in market structure on farmer choices and welfare,
I develop an intra-national trade model based on comparative advantage between
different regions. Each region is endowed with some agricultural productivity over
different crops which will lead to specialization of different regions in different
crops. This is the underlying reason for trade between different regions, just
like in any other Ricardian model. Finally, I use the model to study the impact
of change in market structure on the change in this comparative advantage of
different regions.
Geography: The world is divided into Home and Foreign. Home is a small open
economy divided into regions indexed i = 1, .., I and Foreign i = F . Each region
can also grow agricultural crops indexed by k = 1, .., K. The crops are homoge-
neous and can be traded across different regions. Other than agricultural crops,
manufacturing good denoted by M captures rest of the consumption. Each region
i also consists of set of plots Ωi, with individual plots indexed by ω, each of size




Agents: Each region i consists of three different agents. A representative con-
sumer who supplies labor, takes farming decisions, receives factor payments and
buys consumption goods on the local market. A representative intermediary who
buys farm production. The trader in i buys goods from the intermediaries and
sells them to the final consumer in all regions in Home and Foreign.
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Preferences: The representative consumer in region i spends a fraction b of his


















σ is the elasticity of substitution between different agricultural goods. Also ak
corresponds to crop specific taste shifters and are normalized to add up to one i.e.
∑K
k=1 ak = 1. Since Home is small compared to Foreign and does not have any
impact on Foreign prices, we do not have to specify Foreign preferences as it can
be summarized by just a vector of prices.
The CES consumption bundle on agricultural crops is standard across most trade
models. Since we do not observe intra-national trade data, we would estimate
σ directly from consumption data. Thus we do not use region dependent taste
shifters and assume ak are similar across regions.
The household in each region i also supplies labour inelastically to the agricultural
and manufacturing sector, given by Li,A and Li,M respectively. As the model is re-
stricted to short term predictions, we keep labor immobile across regions as well as
across sectors. The households receives payments from labor and inter-mediation.
Technology: The manufacturing good is produced using constant returns to scale
technology in labor and given by yi,M = Tili,M where Ti is the labor productivity
coefficient. On the agricultural side, we assume land and parcels of land are perfect
complements. By combining φi,k(w) share of plot ω with li,k(w) amount of labor,
a representative farmer can produce:
qi,k(ω) = Λi,k(w)min{φi,k(w), li,k(w)} (1.3)
where qi,k(ω) is the output of crop k if share φi,k(w) of plot ω is allocated to
k. Another important parameter is Λi,k(w) ≥ 0, which denotes the total factor
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productivity of plot ω if allocated to crop k in region i. 5 Also, in Indian context
most farmers are marginal which means plot sizes are small and the labor is tied
to the plot. A similar production function can be derived from Cobb-Douglas
technology as in Sotelo(2016) by restricting the size of plot associated with each
unit of labor. 6 Further, to keep the land choices tractable we impose assumption
on the productivity distribution.
The vector of land productivity, Λi,k(w), for producing different crops k in region
i and plot ω has a Frechet distribution with parameters (γ̄Ai,k, θ):




where γ̄ is a normalization parameter.7 The parameter Ai,K ≥ 0 captures the
average productivity of land for growing k in region i and is thus shared by all
plots ω. A high Ai,K implies that on average all plots in region i have high
productivity for growing crop k. On the other hand, the dispersion in land quality
across the plots in region i is captured by θ, which decreases with increase in θ.
Thus a higher value of θ will imply higher specialization across different regions.
1.3.2 Market Structure
Intermediary: The farmers sell their farm produce to their local representative
intermediary. The farmer in region i gets a farm gate price fi,k for crop k, over
which the intermediary then charges a mark-up µi,k before selling it to the trader,
who then sells it to consumers locally or in other regions. 8 Thus the final con-
sumer price is given by pi,k = µifi,k, in case where crop k is sourced locally. This
is a parsimonious representation of the market structure in India and the market
integration reform can be captured by change in this mark-up µi,k charged by the
5Costinot et al(2014) use a similar production technology with an additional parameter to
capture different labor intensities across different countries. Since, this model is restricted to
India, labor intensity of agricultural production will be same across different regions.
6Sotelo(2016) uses a constant returns to scale production function in labor, land and inter-
mediate inputs and allows for different factor intensities across different crops. Similar choice
can be used here as well.
7Γ is a normalization parameter.
8You can think of it as a bargaining solution between trader and farmer with bargaining
weights β and 1 − β respectively. This µi,k can be derived as a solution to simple bargaining
problem and is shown in the Appendix.
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intermediaries. Post market reform, the intermediaries will see decrease in their
bargaining power, which can be captured by decrease in µi,k.
Trade: Trade is costly between regions and subject to iceberg trade costs, dni,k ≥
1, charged by the transporters. It means the trader in i need to ship dni,k units
of good k in order to sell one unit in region n. Also, dnn,k = 1, for all n and
k i.e. trade is costless within a region and dni,k satisfies the triangle inequality,
dni,k ≤ dnj,k × dji,k. Manufactured goods are traded costlessly within Home, but
cannot be traded between Home and Foreign.
Prices: The farmer gets price fi,k for his produce while final consumers have to
pay pi,k for good k in region i. So, the farmer and consumer decisions are based on
different prices. There is no iceberg cost for shipping manufacturing good within
Home so it has same price PM across all regions.
Home is small open economy so its trading decisions do not change prices in
Foreign. Also, region i in Home bears all iceberg cost for trade with Foreign, i.e.
both to and from the port. Given this assumption, i buys one unit of crop k from
Foreign at diF,kpF,k, while sells it at pi,k/dFi,k.
1.3.3 Decisions
Consumption The representative consumer uses income from all the sources to
maximize his utility given in (1.2) by purchasing consumption goods. The budget
constraint of this consumer is given by:




where Ei is the household income and is given by:






(µi,k − 1)fi,kqi,k (1.6)
17
Given the CES assumption on the household utility from agricultural goods, we







There are a few assumptions embedded in the household income as written above.
The households receive the wage payments from the manufacturing sector as well
as get all the income from the agricultural production. If production technology in
agriculture also required intermediate input, then final consumer would have sub-
tracted that cost from the final revenue. In the model, farmers and intermediaries
are separate entities, so we can also consider a case where representative consumer
only receives income by selling crops at farm gate prices i.e.
∑K
k=1 fi,kqi,k. We will
revisit this question again during welfare calculations.
Production: The representative farmer in region i allocates the land to maximize
his revenue. We fix the reservation wage for agricultural labor equal to zero, so
that all labor is employed as well as it is always profitable to grow some crop
rather than leave the land idle. Given the production technology in (1.3), land
allocation in region i can be solved as a discrete choice problem. Let
ηi,k = Pr{fi,kΛi,k(ω) = max{fi,1Ai,1, ..fi,KAi,K}} (1.8)
denote the probability of assigning plot ω to crop k. Since there is continuum of
plots on Ωi, ηi,k also corresponds to the share of land allocated to crop k in region
i. Given the Frechet assumption on the productivity distribution, we can solve for









The land share allocated to crop k goes up with the marginal product of land,
fi,kAi,K , in crop k. So, amount to land allocated to given crop k rises both in its
farm-gate price fi,k as well as productivity Ai,k. Also, θ captures the sensitivity of
land allocation to different crops. A higher θ makes land allocation more sensitive
to changes in both prices as well as productivity, also leading to more specialization
across regions. Again, the prices used here for decision making are farm-gate prices,
fi,k, because the representative farmer bases his decision on farm gate prices he
receive and not on final consumer prices.




Using law of iterated expectations and given production technology (1.3), we can
write:
qi,k = Hiηi,kE[Λi,k(ω)|fi,kΛi,k(ω) = max{fi,1Ai,1, ..fi,KAi,K}
]
(1.10)
where the term Hiηi,k is the total land in region i devoted to crop k. This follows
from the assumption that each plot is measure one and the total land is equal
to Hi. The last term is equal to the expected productivity of crop k in region i
conditional on crop being produced in region i. Again, given Frechet assumption
this can be solved to give:
E[Λi,k(ω)|fi,kΛi,k(ω) = max{fi,1Ai,1, ..fi,KAi,K}
]
= Ai,k × η−1/θi,k (1.11)
The above equation directly tells that average productivity conditional on a crop
being produced is strictly higher than unconditional average productivity i.e.
Ai,k × η−1/θi,k > Ai,k. Using the above two equation, we then get production of




Trade The transporters in i have access to technology to transport goods to
all other regions in Home as well as both import and export to Foreign. The
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transporters maximize their profits from trade although they would earn zero






zni,k (pn,k − dni,kpi,k) +
K∑
k=1
{zFi,k (pF,k − dFi,kpi,k) + ziF,k (pi,k − diF,kpF,k)}(1.13)
where zni,k are domestic trade flows of good k from i to n. ziF,k and zFi,k are
imports and exports of good k to Foreign respectively. In case of Foreign trade,
iceberg cost diF,k is paid by the transporter at the port. Again, it is important to
mention here that the transporters buy the goods from the intermediary in region
i at price pi,k which is then sold to the consumers in all regions. A simple way
to think about this setup is the following. Transporters buy the final crops from
intermediaries and pay them price pi,k which clears the market. Then in market
i, the intermediaries pay back farm gate price fi,k = (1/µi)pi,k to the farmer. The
transporters in Home take prices in Foreign as given and the amount of trade does
not have any impact on Foreign prices.
1.3.4 Competitive Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium of the economy defined above is given by:
Definition A competitive equilibrium consists of, for each region i = 1, .., I (a)
consumer prices pi,k, farm-gate prices fi,k for all crops k = 1, .., K and pM for
manufactured goods; (b) final good consumption Ci,M and Ci,k for all crops k =
1, .., K; (c) inputs {li,k(ω), φi,k(ω), ω ∈ Ωi} and outputs qi,k for all crops k and
labor input li,M and yi,M for manufactured good M ; (d) trade flows, (i) domestic
zni,k for all regions n = 1, .., I and international (ii) ziF,k and zFi,k, for all crops
k = 1, .., K, such that:
1. quantities in (b) solve the consumer’s problem given income and prices;
2. inputs and outputs in (c) solve manufactured goods producer’s problem, given
prices;
3. inputs and outputs in (c) solve the problem of representative farmer, given
farm gate prices;
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4. agricultural goods prices in (a) are consistent with profit maximization by
traders
pn,k ≤ dni,kpi,k (1.14)
with equality if zni,k ≥ 0, for all regions n, i ∈ {1, .., I, F} and all crops
k = 1, .., K; and with intermediaries giving farmers price fi,k such that
pi,k = µi,kfi,k (1.15)
and the law of one price holds in manufactured good;











φi,k(ω), for all ω ∈ Ωi (1.18)






din,kzin,k, for all k (1.19)
where W = {1, .., I, F}






















where domestic traders pay the iceberg cost both in case of imports as well
as exports
I also normalize the price of manufactured good pM = 1, which completes the
characterization of the competitive equilibrium.
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1.4 Data
This section gives information on the datasets I have collected for this paper. I
use the top 12 crops by area sown in Karnataka between 2000-2011. The region
i in all cases will correspond to a district and is equal to 18 in case of Karnataka
while 340 in case of India. The different datasets that I use are:
1. Integration details: ReMSL(Rashtriya e-Market Services Pvt. Limited)
9 is the nodal organization responsible for rolling out the Unified Market
Platform policy across Karnataka. I collected information on the launch
dates of the program in different markets from this agency.
2. Farm Gate Prices: Agmarket portal run by the Directorate of Marketing
& Inspection10, Government of India collects information on the wholesale
markets, Mandis, across India. Around 2, 700 Mandis from across the coun-
try report data to the above portal on around 350 commodities and 2, 000
varieties. I scraped the data from the above website to get information on
characteristics of Mandis as well as data on daily prices. The Mandis report
three movements of prices- Max, min and modal price for the day as well as
quantities. While the prices are well reported, the quantities of arrival on the
market are not available for more than 80% of the observations.
3. Crop Choices: Data on cropping pattern, crop prices and crop yields is
collected by ICRISAT VDSA (Village Dynamics in South Asia) and covers
information on major crops from 1960s to 2011 at district level. I use in-
formation from VDSA both for Karnataka and India to estimate relevant
parameters in the simulation.
4. Crop Productivity: VDSA provides information on realized crop yields,
which is higher than the potential crop yields in a region. To correct for
it and measure potential crop yield, I use data from GAEZ (Global Agro-
Economic Zones) from FAO, which gives estimates of crop yields in a grid of
5 arc-minute cells. The crop specific potential yields are calculated based on
various geological and weather parameters as well as the intensity of input
(high or low). For a detailed discussion on this dataset, see Costinot and
Donaldson (2014).
9Official website of the organization: http://www.remsl.in/. I would also thank Mr. Manoj
Rajan, CEO ReMSL for discussing relevant information related to the rollout of this policy.
10Official website of the organization: http://agmarknet.gov.in
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5. Consumer Preferences: Data on consumer preferences comes from NSS
(National Sample Survey) 2011-12. The household level dataset contains
detailed information on major commodities & expenditures.
6. Trade Costs: I use the travel time data between different districts as com-
bined by Allen and Atkin(2016) in their recent paper as a measure of trade
costs. I use the information corresponding to 2011 Road Maps of India. I
combine it with freight data to estimate iceberg trade costs. 11
1.5 Estimation
This sections gives details on how to estimate the various parameters needed to
simulate the model and estimate welfare gains. The first subsection gives details
on estimating the change in margin charged by the intermediaries. The remaining
part of this section deals with estimating the other two parameters- heterogeneity
in productivity θ and consumer elasticity σ.
1.5.1 Change in markup due to integration
Theory: The markup, µi,k is the parameter which changed due to the policy
reform. I use the no arbitrage condition between different markets to estimate
the change ∆µi,k. Let’s say two markets i and j supply non-zero quantity of a
good k to market l, both before and after the integration and only market i gets
integrated. The price arbitrage condition before integration in period t1 requires:
pl,kt1 = µ1i,kdli,kfi,kt1 = µ1j,kdlj,kfj,kt1 (1.22)
while post-integration in period t2:
pl,kt2 = µ2i,kdli,kfi,kt2 = µ1j,kdlj,kfj,kt2 (1.23)
11I have collected freight rates data from an emerging portal which matches truckers with
potential customers: http://www.truckbhada.com/, and provides information on freight rates
between different cities and is a good measure of transportation costs.
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where µ1i,k and µ2i,k correspond to the markups in market i at time t1 and t2
respectively, while in market 2 the markup remains the same i.e. µ2i,k in both
periods.
Assumption: Markups in market j do not change due to change in market struc-
ture in i in period t2.
Since, the policy was rolled out over a period of time, it is possible to identify
change in µ by using the two equations given above and the assumption on change















The above equation allows us to estimate change in mark-up by directly looking
at the farm gate prices both before and after the integration. Since market i gets
integrated, we expect µ2i,k to go down post integration. This is captured by the







in period t1. This equation allows us to estimate changes
in µ separately for each of the different markets i. For the rest of this exercise
I would assume that markups are the same across markets and depend only on
their integration status i.e. µ1 before integration and µ2 after integration.
The assumption on change in markup would definitely be a concern in estimations
over a longer horizon where the other layers of transporters and consumers change
in response to policy reform. But since we are restricting our empirical estimations
to immediately after the implementation of policy, it is safe to assume that there is
no change in behavior of agents in other markets due to change in market structure
just in market i. This is not a very restrictive assumption in short run as the layers
of transporters and consumers are fairly competitive and would take a long time
to change. But if we wait for the change in these other layers we would identify
not just change in margin of intermediaries but also the change in whole market
structure.
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Another concern with the above assumption is related to the anticipation of the
policy in other markets. If the traders in unintegrated markets feel that they
would soon be integrated, they might decide to charge higher markups for the
remaining few months to get a higher profit. Even if this concern were true, we
would expect that markets which get integrated later on will show lower change
in markup due to them charging higher markups just before integration. This
would bias our estimator for change in markups downwards and under-estimate
the impact of the policy. Also I am using Bangalore as an unintegrated market,
which remain unintegrated for the whole duration, and is a bigger market than all
others so this should be less of a concern.
While it is directly possible to estimate the change in markups µ from consumer
price data pi,k, but I use only farm-gate price data for this exercise. There are
two reasons for it. Firstly, I only have access to farm gate price data both before
and after the policy change. There is no consumer survey data right before or
after the policy change. Secondly, consumer price data is less precise and noisy
as it is calculated from the household surveys using backward calculations from
self-reported household expenditure and consumption. Due to these problems, I
stick to using only farm-gate price data for this estimation. Although theoretically
it is possible to use price arbitrage conditions to back out the changes in µ even
from consumer price data.
Estimation: To estimate the change in markups as described above, I use Banga-
lore as the base market for comparison with other integrated markets. Bangalore
is the capital city of Karnataka and did not get integrated till September 2015, the
time period for which I have collected the data. Bangalore being the capital city
is a good benchmark for this exercise, since being the capital city a lot of trade
flows through this market and it is also used by other traders for gauging state
wide market prices. We will focus on groundnut as it is one of the main crops in
Karnataka and has high trade volumes on the Bangalore market.
Figure (1.9) shows the impact of integration on the modal farm gate price ratio





. The plot shows the
evolution of residuals of price ratio after filtering out the market and time fixed
effects. The top two rows correspond to the markets that got integrated during this
period i.e. before 30 June 2015. The vertical line in these two panels corresponds
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to the date of integration. The third row shows the three markets that did not
get integrated during this period to show the impact on control group.






due to change in policy. The control markets in the
third row do not show any similar increase when compared to their historical
levels. Another point to notice here is that the residuals are fairly close to zero
and bundled up together before the policy change both in the integrated and non-
integrated markets. But post policy change, the residuals in integrated markets
are much more dispersed, highlighting that the new intermediaries are driving
this change and price discovery became more noisy. There is no similar change in
non-integrated markets.
Instead of looking at figure (1.9), a similar exercise can be done by looking at
average price ratio both before and after integration as shown in table . While
the average modal price ratio across markets is 1.03 before integration, it jumps
to 1.46 after integration. Similar result holds for ratio of maximum price in these
markets. The minimum price ratio although increases from the initial value but
it does not increase as much as the other two ratios.
Instead of looking at full sample, we can also look at how the price ratio changed
just for the integrated markets. Here we again see that the modal price ratio has
jumped up from around 1 to around 1.5 i.e. by almost 50 percent. This same
exercise can be done in the spirit of regression discontinuity exercise by comparing
price ratios just before and after the integration where the last panel in table 1
computes the same ratio for 2 months before and after the integration and once
again we can see that price ratio jumps up. The only difference in the last case
being that here the price ratio jumps up from 1.17 to around 1.8. Since there
is seasonality in these price ratios with an yearly cycle, taking ratio just before
and after the policy change will give a biased measure of ratio change. As many
markets get integrated around September 2014, the two months prior and after
belong to two different seasonal cycles as can be seen from figure (1.9). To get
correct estimate for change in price ratio, we need to filter out seasonal noise,
which can be done by including time fixed effects.













= β*Integrationit + δi + νt + ǫit (1.25)
where β captures the impact of integration on price ratio, while δi and νt denote
market and time fixed effects respectively. Since the data has panel dimension,
using the above estimation equation (1.25) also allows us to control for unobserved
market heterogeneity through δi. The underlying identification assumption in the
above equation is that the dummy variable Integration is the only change in market
level characteristics and it captures the change in market power of traders.
This assumption also means that integrating market i does not change markup
decisions by traders in another market j. This applies to both integrated as
well as unintegrated markets. It is good assumption for the unintegrated market
since farmers are still captive on such a market without any other outside option.
Also, if traders by looking at prices in integrated markets change their markups,
they would have to pay increased prices to the traders, thus downward biasing
our estimate for β. On the other hand, if traders are active on multiple integrated
markets it can potentially change the information flow in the whole market, thereby
generating dependence among the integrated markets12. But since very few traders
are active on multiple markets, the major thrust of policy change comes through
increasing the number of local traders on each market, thus changing only the
market power µ of traders.
The results of running regression equation (1.25) are shown in table 2. The market





by 0.2. Since the
average modal price ratio was almost 1, this implies a change of 20% in the modal
price ratio or a 16.66% change in value of µ. So, an average integrated market gets
20 percent higher modal price as compared to Bangalore market post integration.
The ratio of maximum price also shows similar increase and is 25 percent higher
than pre-integration maximum price ratio.
As a robustness measure for the validity of DD strategy, I also check for divergence
in trends of price ratios in the integrated vs non-integrated markets. This is done
12See Allen(2015) on information value of trade. In the short run we do not expect big changes
to take place on this dimension. Also, market prices did not differ too much in the pre-integration
period to expect huge change from information flow across regions. Most of the traders on these
markets had access to daily price movements across all markets available through internet and
local newspapers
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by including pseudo treatment indicators for periods before the true treatment.
The coefficients on pseudo treatment dummies (two, four and six months before
treatment) are close to zero and insignificant and are shown in figure 1.7.
1.5.2 Demand Elasticity, σ
The demand elasticity parameter σ can be recovered by using equation (1.7), which
gives the share of consumer spending on each of the agricultural goods. Taking
log of equation (1.7) gives us the following estimation equation:
ln (sn,k) = (1− σ)lnpn,k − (1− σ)lnPn + logak (1.26)
Here, the elasticity parameter can be recovered by regressing log expenditure share
sn,k on price pn,k of crop k. Including terms on area fixed effects in the regression
will filter out the term corresponding to aggregate price index in region n, while
fixed-effect term on crop will give us the crop specific demand shifters ak.
To estimate demand elasticity, I use 2011-12 NSS data which gives detailed infor-
mation on household consumer expenditure. The consumer prices are recovered
using information on expenditure and quantities which requires correction for mea-
surement errors. Also, there are potential endogeneity issues with the above re-
gression. To correct for these problems, I instrument pn,k by district level median
prices with the identification assumption being that supply shocks can be spatially
correlated but not the demand shocks. The IV estimate gives an value 2.3 for σ,
which is higher than the OLS estimate.
1.5.3 Heterogeneity in Productivity, θ
The equation (1.9) on land shares gives us a way to estimate θ by combining
information on district level productivity Ai,k, farm-gate prices fi,k and land shares




log ηi,k + πi + ρk + ǫi,k (1.27)
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A high value of ηi,k points to high value of productivity Ai,K in region i for crop
k. But farmers can also decide to grow more of crop k if the farm-gate prices fi,k
are high. I assume that GAEZ productivity is a noisy measure of productivity
and is measured with some error, ǫi,k. This assumption along with πi and ρk, i.e.
region and crop fixed effects respectively, allows me to filter out the supply side
shocks. For estimating the above equation, I take mean value of land shares, ηi,k,
and farm-gate prices, fi,K , from the year 2000-2011, as present in VDSA dataset
at the district level. Running the above regression with fixed-effects gives me an
estimate of 2.2 for θ.
1.5.4 Other parameters
For the counter-factual exercise, I need to estimate other parameters which I ex-
plain here. The spending on crops is available on aggregate level for Karnataka,
which is given by b = 0.2. The ROW price pF,k for crop k, is measured as average
price of these crops across India.
I also estimate the iceberg trade costs dni,k by using data on freight costs and travel
time between region n and i from Allen and Atkin (2016) and freight data which
I have collected. The regression of freight costs on travel times gives an estimate
for iceberg costs. Lastly, I cannot estimate the margin charged on each crop ui,k
separately for each of the regions due to lack of observations on consumer price,
so I assume that margin charged on each crop is same across regions and equal
to uk, which I then estimate as mean ratio of consumer price to farm-gate price
pi,k/fi,k for regions which produce crop k. Since the iceberg costs satisfy triangle
equality, it implies that a region which produces crop k also sells it on its local
market.
1.6 Welfare analysis
Having estimated the relevant parameters in the last section, we can now use the
model for studying counter-factual scenarios. Although there are 155 separate
agricultural Mandis in Karnataka, but land use and other data is only available
at the district level. So, for the counter-factuals we will restrict model simulation
to only 17 markets or districts. Also I include top 11 crops from Karnataka which
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contribute 85% to the total farm revenue in the state. Also, for foreign trade I
assume that it is routed through the capital city of Bangalore. So, iceberg trade
cost for international trade from region i will be a product of iceberg cost from
region i to Bangalore and then to the ROW.
In the remaining part of this section, we will evaluate two different counter-factual
exercises under the assumption that margin charged by intermediaries goes down
by 16% across half of the crops. The next two subsections give detail on these two
different scenario.
Partial adjustment: In this case, farmers are not allowed to change their crop-
ping decision in the aftermath of policy reform. This can be thought of as a
short-term impact of reform, where farmers are stuck with their cropping pattern
but reduced margins change the comparative advantage of different regions.
Full adjustment: In the long run farmers would be able to change their cropping
decisions to take into account the changed environment. Under full adjustment
we solve for competitive equilibrium for new values of µk.
The welfare change is calculated from the absolute change in utility of representa-
tive consumer in each region. The change under two scenarios is shown in figure
1.8. The first thing to notice from the figure is that under full adjustment all but
one region see a positive change in its welfare. Although some regions gain more
than others, but on average the welfare gains in this case are 1.3%. The partial
adjustment case is not so stark with some regions losing while others gaining on
overall welfare. The regions which lose in this case are primarily productive in
crops for which µk does not change post reform. This means that welfare gains in
short run are cornered by regions which grow crops that stand to gain from the
change in policy reform.
1.7 Conclusion
The paper has highlighted the important role of market structure in determining
intra-national trade costs. It exploits a policy reform, which limited the market
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power of these intermediaries to estimate the size of margins charged by the in-
termediaries in agricultural markets in India, thus giving an idea on the size of
surplus cornered by intermediaries in developing countries. The presence of such
high margins gives another policy tool to reduce intra-national trade barriers,
similar to transportation or other infrastructure development.
Using a Ricardian style comparative advantage model of trade in agricultural
goods, I also quantify the welfare gains from this policy reform. The counter-
factual scenario in the paper was used to evaluate the gains from reducing inter-
mediary margin for different crops. I show that it would lead to an average 1.3%
welfare gains in Karnataka in the long run through production adjustments.
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Although µ encompasses a large number of wedges, but can be rationalized as
a Nash bargaining problem between farmer and intermediary over total surplus.
Let’s say:
• Trader’s share β and farmer’s share 1− β
• Sunk production cost for farmer so bargaining only over final output.
• Nash Bargaining over total surplus pq, which is defined by:
maxa a
β(pq − a)(1−β)
• Trader’s share a = βpq
• Farmer’s share pq−a = (1−β)pq = fq, and he gets paid in terms of farm-gate
price, (1− β)p = f .
• Or, final consumer price p = 1
(1−β)
f and markup- µ = 1
(1−β)
1.9.2 Equilibrium in algorithm
The equilibrium in the algorithm consists of solving the following equations for
prices pi,k and trade zni,k:
Market Clearing:






djizji,k = 0 , ∀i, k
No arbitrage:
pn,k ≤ dnipi,k with zni,k ≥ 0 , ∀i, j, k
and pn,k = dnipi,k iff zni,k = 0
Both Ci,k and qi,k are already be solved in terms of other deep parameters and
prices, which are directly fed into the algorithm.
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1.10 Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Market Summary
Non-integrated Integrated All
Annual Expenditure (Million Rs) 76.81 73.91 75.5
(45.23) (41.46) (43.44)
Annual Income (Million Rs) 72.14 79.54 75.4
(43.86) (42.91) (43.44)
Area Served (Villages) 65.88 63.93 64.98
(39.46) (37.71) (38.55)
Traders 165 171 166
(105) (93) (103)
Total Markets 84 71 155
Note: Till Sep ’15 and all crops Mean and (standard deviation)




Integration 148.688∗∗ 108.058 −33.697
(78.352) (107.455) (105.529)
Observations 9,912 9,912 9,912
R2 0.800 0.758 0.727
Adjusted R2 0.777 0.731 0.696
Residual Std. Error (df = 8917) 289.338 332.456 321.080
Note: Std errors clustered at market-time.
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Integration 21.613 12.933 5.008
(20.370) (30.052) (20.254)
Observations 20,473 20,473 20,473
R2 0.802 0.614 0.753
Adjusted R2 0.778 0.568 0.724
Residual Std. Error (df = 18306) 61.795 163.665 67.996










Before integration 1.03 1.04 0.91
After integration 1.46 1.52 1.02
Observations 6,618 6,618 6,618
Only integrated markets
Before integration 0.96 0.96 0.84
After integration 1.51 1.55 1.10
Observations 5,626 5,626 5,626
2 months around Integration
Before integration 1.17 1.20 1.03
After integration 1.80 1.89 1.36
Observations 670 670 670







on full Sample for Groundnut
Dependent variable:
modal R maxP R minP R
(1) (2) (3)
Integration 0.198∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ −0.023
(0.081) (0.071) (0.079)
Market FE Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,618 6,618 6,618
R2 0.392 0.413 0.366
Adjusted R2 0.384 0.406 0.358
Residual Std. Error (df = 6537) 0.502 0.472 0.503
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 1.7: Testing for parallel trends between integrated and non-integrated
markets. Each point on x-axis corresponds to 60 days before/after integration.










































Figure 1.8: Comparison of absolute welfare change due to 16% change in
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This paper introduces the concept of diffusion of shocks in a macroeconomic network con-
sisting of inter-sectoral production linkages. I show that if sectors have different reaction
horizons it would lead to diffusion of shocks through the network over time which pre-
vents the inter-sectoral linkages to form the feedback loop structure essential to generate
aggregate volatility. This result is different from other recent papers which have single
period model with contemporaneous production linkages between different sectors thus
generating sectoral shock amplification as one sector reacts to another contemporaneously
resulting in bigger aggregate fluctuations. In contrast if sectors have different production
horizons due to varying complexity of their production process or supply chain, it would
break down the feedback architecture present in single period models. I further show that
if the diffusion rate is varied for different sectors, the contribution of network structure to
aggregate volatility can be insignificant. Also, it is no longer sufficient to characterize this
contribution of inter-sectoral production network to aggregate volatility by just looking
at input-output matrix or its summary statistics like degree distribution. The paper thus
highlights the stark difference between the study of financial and inter-sectoral production
networks because of the possibility of contemporaneous amplification and hence cascades
in the case of financial networks. In the end, I propose lead time indicator as a possible




It is one of the oldest debates in economics whether idiosyncractic shocks to in-
dividual sectors can generate aggregate volatility in the economy. Beginning with
Lucas (1977), who argued that such shocks to individual sectors would die down
in the aggregate economy due to diversification, it has been further analyzed in
Dupor (1998) and Horvath (1999). With the development of new tools that are
available to analyze networks now, there has been a renewed interest in revisiting
this old question. This debate has been carried forward in the recent paper by
Acemoglu et al(2012) who uses a network argument to show that in the presence
of input-output linkages, small idiosyncratic shocks can generate aggregate fluctu-
ations depending on the structure of the network. According to their argument,
it is possible to generate such aggregate volatility from idiosyncratic shocks if the
input-output network is highly asymmetric and a few big sectors provide input to
a large number of other sectors .
Most of the papers with argument in favor of this hypothesis have a static pro-
duction framework where the productivity shocks propagate contemporaneously
through the whole economy in just one period. Due to static nature of the pro-
duction setup the general equilibrium effects create a feedback loop in their model
which allows them to generate big fluctuations on the aggregate level. In contrast,
if we allow shocks to diffuse through the network with a certain lag, this feedback
loop can break down and can substancially attenuate the amplification of shocks.
This paper shows how we can think about diffusion in a production economy and
then highlights two aspects associated with inclusion of diffusion and allowing for
different diffusion rates between different sectors.
The first part of the paper highlights the difference generated by allowing for a one
period diffusion lag in the economy. Here I compare the model presented in Long
and Plosser (1983), which is a one period diffusion model, with a zero period diffu-
sion model of Acemoglu et al (2012). Due to contemporaneous production linkages
between sectors in case of zero period diffusion model, the aggregate volatility due
to sectoral shocks is higher in such an economy. This fact has been shown em-
pirically in the paper by Sarte et al (2011). I further show that in a zero period
diffusion model not only the aggregate volatility is higher but the contribution
of network linkages to aggregate volatility is also higher. Actually this increase
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in aggregate volatility is achieved through the hightened role of sectoral linkages,
which amplify the shocks due to the contemporaneous production function.
But the actual production economy is far from this contemporaneous production
function that is normally used in zero-period models. In the real economy, output
from one sector does not act as an input to another sector in the same period.
The different sectors in economy have different production horizons and there is
a significant time lag between initialization and completion of production. This
fact is well presented in the paper by Humphreys et al (2001) where they discuss
the importance of input inventories for firms. This idea is captured in the supply
chain management and inventory literature by the concept of lead time. Figure
2.1 shows the density plot of average lead time for different sectos at the 3-digit
NAICS level. The lead time is measured from M3 database of US census and is the
ratio of unfulfilled shipments to value of shipments every month. This ratio can
then be converted into weeks to capture production horizon. For eg. the ratio of 1
gives a lead time of one month because the unfulfilled shipments is equal to value
of shipments. Now looking at figure 2.1 we can see that average production horizon
for sectors is approximately ten weeks but there are significant number of sectors
which have to plan their production much far ahead. This clearly highlights the
presence of some kind of friction in the sectoral production system and takes us
away from the contemporaneous production function. This same effect is further
highlighted in figure 2.2 as a response of durable and non-durable goods sector
to the Lehman crisis. The non-durable goods have a lower lead time and their
production can be adjusted very quickly. The non-durable goods reacted sharply
to the 2008 crisis and hit their lowest levels in four months. In contrast, the
durable goods have longer production horizon and it took much longer for these
sectors to cut their production. Thus it took almost more than a year before the
shipments and inventory level of durable goods touched their lowest level.
The second part of the paper builds on this fact about difference in lead times
across sectors. Since the sectors have different lead times, they plan their produc-
tion at different times and thus react to the shock in period t at different times.
I subsequently develop a multi-sector model where different sectors have different
production horizons and use inputs from different time periods. This eventually
gives a model with different diffusion rates for different sectors and further at-
tenuates the amplification of shocks. Now a shock to a given sector i in time
period t affects its downstream sectors at different period of time. This creates a
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Figure 2.1: Average lead time across sectors (3-digit NAICS)
diversification in response of different sectors at any given time. Thus even if a
sector has large out-degree i.e. it provides intermediate input to a large number
of downstream sectors, the chances of this sector generating aggregate volatility
would go down as its downstream sectors have different production horizons and
would react to the same shock in different periods.
I finally show that input-output matrix is not a sufficient statistic to understand
whether sectoral shocks can generate aggregate volatility. As shown in Acemoglu
et al (2012), if the weighted out-degree of sectors has a heavy tailed distribution,
it is sufficient to generate aggregate fluctuations from sectoral shocks. In the
presence of unequal diffusion rates for different sectors it depends on another
measure which I call diffusion adjusted weighted out-degree. This measure in
contrast depends both on input-output matrix and diffusion rate of different sectors
in the economy. As I would later show the sum of these diffusion adjusted out-
degrees for a given sector is equal to the out-degree measure present in zero-
period diffusion model. This in turn makes it difficult to generate a heavy tailed
distribution for adjusted out-degree measure. So, it is possible but increasingly
difficult to generate aggregate volatility from idiosyncratic shocks when sectors
have different diffusion rates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I develop and compare
the two canonical zero-period and one-period diffusion models. This is then used
to illustrate the difference in aggregate volatility generated due to this change in
assumption. Section 3 provides a sketch of micro-founded production model for
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Figure 2.2: Reaction of durable and non-durable sectors after Lehmann crisis
sectors with unequal diffusion rates and extend it to a n sectors. This model is
then used to highlight the diversification impact of unequal diffusion over time on
aggregate volatility. Section 4 concludes.
2.2 Diffusion: Two canonical models
The phenomenon of shock diffusion can be illustrated by comparing two basic
models which have been used frequently and interchangably in the literature. The
first class consists of models where shocks diffuse in the same period and affect
other sectors contemporaneously. This in turn impact their own production deci-
sion in the same period and generate a feedback loop. I would call these models
as zero period diffusion(0PD) models. Some of these models are presented in Car-
valho(2008), Acemoglu et al(2012), Dupor(1998) etc. The second class consists of
primarily one period diffusion(1PD) model as presented in Long and Plosser(1983)
where firms use inputs from the previous period for production.
In this section, I would present the basic and comparable 0PD and 1PD models as
presented in Carvalho(2008) and Long and Plosser(1983). I would then use these
models to highlight the difference in contribution of network interconnectivity to
aggregate volatility that one can generate from considering the speed of diffusion
of shocks.
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2.2.1 0PD- Acemoglu et al (2012)
Consider a multisector economy consisting of N different sectors indexed by i =
1, .., N . Each sector i produces a different good of quantity Yit at date t using labor
Lit and input Xijt from other sectors j = 1, .., N . The Cobb-Douglas production









△Zit = log(εit), εit ∼ N(0, σi) (2.2)
where Zit is the productivity shock to sector i in period t. △Zit is log-normal and
i.i.d across sectors and time unless otherwise stated. Xijt is the input from sector
j used in the production by sector i.
The production linkages provide the source of interconnectedness between the
sectors and is present in the exponent γij ≥ 0. This inter-sectoral connectivity
can be completely captured by N × N matrix Γ = [γij]N×N where element ij
corresponds to the share of input j for production in sector i. This matrix Γ
would be referred to as input-output matrix in the rest of the paper. For now I
assume that share of labor α ∈ (0, 1) in production is constant across all sectors.
The column sums of Γ capture the importance of a sector as an intermediate
input for production in other sectors. This is defined as weighted out-degree in
Acemoglu et al(2012). I further assume that the production functions exhibit
constant returns to scale which is captured by:
Assumption (A1):
∑N
j=1 γij = 1, for all i = 1, .., N
On the consumption side there is a representative agent who derives utility by
consuming the above mentioned N goods produced in the economy and supplies












θi = 1 and θi > 0, ∀i (2.4)
Since, there is no inter-temporal decision making involved in production, the above
problem can be solved as a set of static problems corresponding to each time pe-
riod, t. Finally, we can close the model by defining the set of resource constraints:
N∑
i=1




Xjit = Yit , ∀i = 1, .., N (2.6)
Let yit = log Yit and yt be the vector of log sectoral output. Then, Acemoglu et
al(2012) show that the competitive equilibrium of the above economy can be given
by:
yt = µ0 + [I − (1− α)Γ]−1 zt (2.7)
where µ0 is a N-dimensional vector of constants depending on the model parame-
ters. Since, we are interested in aggregate growth volatility we can look at:
△yt = [I − (1− α)Γ]−1 εt (2.8)
Using the fact that all eigenvalues of (1 − α)Γ are strictly less than one, we can







εt ≈ [I + (1− α)Γ] εt (2.9)
I have ignored the second order interconnections in the above equation because it
would make it easier to compare it with one period diffusion model. Although it
is well documented that in a network economy second order interconnections can
also matter. As I will show later, the ignored second order terms would be present
in case of 1PD model as well, so we do not loose much in terms of comparison.
Using the above equation, Acemoglu et al(2012) later show how aggregate volatility
of economy would depend on weighted out-degree of sectors. This captures the
relative importance of a sector as input to all other sectors. Given a fat-tailed
distribution of weighted out-degrees one will obtain that aggregate volatility does
not decay at rate
√
n. For now, lets look at the aggregate volatility from a practical
point of view:
V ar0PD(△yt) = Σεε + (1− α)2ΓΣεεΓ′ + (1− α)ΣεεΓ′ + (1− α)ΓΣεε





This aggregate volatility statistic is based on giving equal weight to all sectors,
but it is possible to use a more realistic weighted measure when taking the model
to the data. For volatility analysis, this statistic has been used frequently in the
literature (see Horvath, 1998, or Dupor, 1999 or Carvalho, 2008). But comparison
of the 0PD and 1PD model would be the same even if we were to consider any
other sectoral weights.
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2.2.2 1PD- Long and Plosser (1983)
The 0PD model is very similar to the classic Long and Plosser (1983) model. Now,
the production in sector i in period t depends on the inputs purchased in period









The problem of the representative household remains the same as in the previous
0PD model. The resource constraint also remains the same except that the input




Xjit = Yit , ∀i = 1, .., N (2.12)
We can again denote the log sectoral output as yt and solve for planner’s problem.
Long and Plosser (1983) show that the solution to planner’s problem is given by:
yt = µ1 + (1− α)Γyt−1 + zt (2.13)
where µ1 is a N-dimensional vector of constants depending on the model parame-
ters. Since, we are interested in aggregate volatility we can work with demeaned
output:
△yt = [I − (1− α)ΓL]−1 εt (2.14)









εt ≈ [I + (1− α)ΓL] εt = εt + (1− α)Γεt−1 (2.15)
Similar to 0PD model, now we can write sectoral and aggregate volatility terms
for 1PD diffusion model:





One key point to differentiate 1PD model from 0PD is the timing for usage of
inputs. In 0PD model, the shock from sector i immediately propagates to other
sector and then affects sector i production through general equilibrium effect. This
generates a feedback loop and amplification of shocks. In 1PD model on the other
hand, shocks do affect other sectors but only with a lag of one period due to the
time constraint on production. Now a shock to a sector i has a contemporaneous
effect on itself but only a lagged one on all others, therefore there is no feedback
from the other sectors to the sector i and in turn again on other sectors. This
partially closes down the amplification channel as present in 0PD model.
It is a common practice to treat all these models interchangeably but as shown
above they are very different in their amplification potential. This point has been
ignored in other papers where the models can have extended framework involving
capital and labor but inputs are produced and used in the same period. For eg.
the model in Horvath (1998) solves infinite horizon problem for the social planner
but still uses inputs produced in the same period. The output dependence on
previous period comes only through the capital market. In terms of production
linkages it is still a 0PD model and allows for contemporaneous feedback and
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amplification of shocks in production. On the other hand, the 1PD model uses
inputs from previous periods and do not allow contemporaneous amplification of
shocks through network structure.
2.2.3 0PD vs 1PD models
Proposition 1: The aggregate volatility in case of 0PD model is always higher
than 1PD model:
V ol0PD(△y) > V ol1PD(△y) (2.17)
The result here follows directly from the definition of aggregate volatility for the
two models. The result will hold even if we include higher order terms in the power
series expansion due to the fact that 0PD model will always include the volatility
terms present in 1PD model. The reason for different aggregate volatility is due
to production lag in case of 1PD model which leads to dropping out the variance
term involving cross product of εt and (1 − α)Γεt−1. Under the assumption of
no auto-correlation of shocks across sectors, this cross product term is completely
dropped out. But the result would hold even if there is small auto-correlation
between shocks over time.
Definition : Network contribution to aggregate volatility(NC) is the fraction of
volatility contributed by the terms involving network structure parameters.
It can be defined as:
NC = 1− 1
′Σεε1
V ol(△y) (2.18)
Network contribution is an important metric because it shows the importance of
inter-sectoral linkages in generating aggregate volatility. If there were no intersec-
toral linkages, the aggregate volatility will just be the sum of sector level variances
and is captured by the term 1′Σεε1. The other terms in aggregate volatility con-
tain Γ, which captures the increase in aggregate volatility due to inter-sectoral
linkages.
54
Proposition 2: The network contribution to aggregate volatility is always higher
for 0PD model:
NC0PD > NC1PD (2.19)
Proof: The result follows directly from proposition 1. Since, the non-network
term, 1′Σεε1 in aggregate volatility is the same for both 0PD and 1PD models







2.2.4 Irrelevance of higher order diffusion process
The 1PD Long and Plosser (1983) model can be written similarly for a n-period
diffusion model, with production lag of n periods. This model would seem to
correspond to a slower rate of diffusion of shocks in the economy. But any such
model would have no fundamental difference with 1PD model in terms of aggregate
volatility. This can be summarized by:
Definition : The vector of sectoral growth rates for an n-period diffusion model
will be given by:
△yt = [I − (1− α)ΓLn]−1 εt ≈ εt + (1− α)Γεt−n (2.21)
Proposition 3: The aggregate volatility or NC do not depend on production lag
i.e.:
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V ol1PD(△y) = V ol2PD(△y)... = V olnPD(△y) (2.22)
NC1PD(△y) = NC2PD(△y)... = NCnPD(△y) (2.23)
The above proposition shows that all production lags give the same value for
aggregate volatility as well as the network contribution to aggregate volatility.
This follows from the fact that demeaned output vector depends on two terms;
current shock, εt and a lagged shock, εt−n times the network term (1 − α)Γ. In
terms of diffusion process the nPD is no different than 1PD because period, t
output only depends on lagged output from one other period. In case of 1PD,
this input comes from period t− 1 and in case of nPD it comes from t− n. So it
does not have any additional dampening effects. In contrast if firms were allowed
and find it optimal to smoothen their response to shock from period t − n for n
periods, then the results could be different.
But at the same time, the above proposition also highlights the difference between
contemporaneous production process as in 0PD model and a lagged production
process in any nPD model. So for the case where firms are not allowed to smoothen
their response over n periods, proposition 3 would apply and considering a produc-
tion processes with more than one period lag will not change any results. For all
practical purposes, one can use 0PD and 1PD models to highlight the difference
caused by diffusion rate.
2.3 Model: Unequal diffusion rate(UDR)
Since different sectors have different production horizons, it makes sense to study a
model where all sectors do not react to shocks at the same time. As discussed in the
introduction and explained through figure 2.1, average lead time varies significantly
for different sectors and determines their production horizon. The sector with
small production horizon would buy its input just preceding production, while
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another sector with a longer production horizon might contract its inputs multiple
periods before production can begin.
This difference in production horizon would create a difference in how sectors react
to shocks. A sector with longer production horizon would react with a delay to the
shock to its upstream sectors. Consider a sector which buys its inputs in period
t − 2 for production in period t. Since the sector is unable to tinker or change
its production quickly, the shock to its supplier in period t − 2 can affect it only
in period t. In comparison, a sector which purchases its input in period t− 1 for
production in period t would react in period t if there is any shock to its suppliers
in period t−1. In a multi-sector setting this would lead to slow diffusion of shocks
through a sector with longer production horizon. Thus a multi-sector model with
sectors having different production horizons would generate unequal diffusion rate
of shocks in different parts of the economy.
2.3.1 3-sector economy
Consider a 3-sector model with the restrictions discussed above. The setting is
similar to Long and Plosser (1983) with one change. Sector 1 and 2 have a small
production horizon and use inputs from period t − 1 for production in period t.
On the other hand, sector 3 has a longer production horizon and uses inputs from


















where Zit is the productivity shock to sector i in period t and εt is log-normal and
i.i.d. as before. The representative agent wants to maximize life-time utility and






The restrictions on the utility are same as in section 2. The resource constraint is





Xjit = Yit , ∀i = 1, .., N (2.27)
Now, we can solve the planner’s problem for this economy. The planner wants
to maximize the expected lifetime utility of the agent subject to production func-
tions given in (3.1) and (3.2), resource constraint (3.4) and labor market clearing
conditions. This can be expressed as a value function problem:
V (St) = max {U(Ct) + βV (St+1|St) (2.28)
where St = (Yt, Zt) is the set of state variables. This problem can be solved by
“guess and verify”, which gives the following solution:
V (St) = k1ln Y1t + k2ln Y2t + k3ln Y3t+1 + J(Zt) +K (2.29)
where ki is a set of constants given by:
ki = θi + β
3∑
j=1
kjγji, ∀i = 1, 2, 3 (2.30)
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J(Zt) depends on production uncertainty parameters while K is also constant
and do not depend on Yt or Zt. This finally gives us the consumption and input
quantities at time t as given in the appendix.
Given the solution above, we can now focus on output in different sectors. It would
help us compare the solution obtained here with that in the previous section. The
log output for unequal diffusion rate (UDR) model is given by:
y1t = µudr1 + (1− α) [γ11y1t−1 + γ12yt−2 + γ13yt−3] + z1t (2.31)
y2t = µudr2 + (1− α) [γ21y1t−1 + γ22yt−2 + γ23yt−3] + z2t (2.32)
y3t = µudr3 + (1− α) [γ31y1t−1 + γ32yt−2 + γ33yt−3] + z3t (2.33)
where µudr terms are constants that depend on model parameters. The above
solution can be better summarized in matrix form below:
yt = µudr + (1− α) [Γ1yt−1 + Γ2yt−2] + zt (2.34)

















Γ = Γ1 + Γ2 (2.37)
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The above equation 2.34 captures the dynamics of the economy. The input-output
matrix Γ still governs how sectoral outputs affect future production but it now gets
split up in two matrices Γ1 and Γ2. Sectors 1 and 2 which have a production horizon
of 1 period gets directly affected through Γ1 where subscript 1 corresponds to 1-
period production horizon. Sector 3, since it has a different production horizon of
2 periods gets directly impacted through Γ2 from shocks that hit the economy in
period t− 2.
2.3.2 n-sector economy
Given the mechanism in the last sub-section we can easily get a reduced form
solution for any n-sector economy with production linkages. Any such economy
where sectors can have up to p-periods of production horizon will have a solution
of VAR(P) form given by:
yt = µudr + (1− α) [Γ1yt−1 + ...+ Γpyt−p] + zt (2.38)
△yt =
[














Γ = Γ1 + ..+ ΓP (2.41)
The solution to n-sector and P period production horizon economy has an easy
reduced form as shown in equation 2.38. Since the economy now has sectors with
P different production horizons, the input-output matrix Γ gets split up into P
components.
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2.3.3 1PD vs UDR models
Proposition 4: The aggregate volatility in case of 0PD and 1PD models is always
higher than UDR model:
V ol0PD(y) > V ol1PD(y) > V olUPR(y) (2.42)






























1 = V olUPD(y)
This proposition establishes the decreases in aggregate volatility caused due to
unequal diffusion rates over different sectors. The unequal diffusion rates spread
the impact of a shock to sector i in period t across different periods for its different
downstream consumers. It is essential for all the downstream sectors to react
contemporaneously to one shock to generate substantial aggregate volatility. But
unequal diffusion rates close down this amplification channel and do not allow
for contemporaneous reaction for all sectors. I will further show in next sub-
section below how this addition of time dimension to shock propagation can affect
asymptotic properties.
The mechanism is better explained by looking at figure 2.3. Sector 1 is the only
input supplier in the economy and supplies to all other sectors in the economy.
The upper half of the figure corresponds to 1-period diffusion model. Here, a shock
hits sector 1 in period t and then affects all the downstream sectors together in
period t+1. Now compare this to the bottom half of the figure which represents an
unequal diffusion rate economy where sectors 2 and 3 buy their input with 1 period
production lag while 4 and 5 buy with 2 period production lag. In this second
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Economy with unequal diffusion rate
Figure 2.3: Shock propagation through the economy. Blue color correspond
to sectors currently affected by shock that hit sector 1 in period t.
economy, the shock to sector 1 affects different parts of economy at different times.
Thus on the aggregate the contribution of this shock that hits sector 1 in period t
to aggregate volatility is diminished as all sectors do not react at the same time.
So, even if a sector is supplier to a large number of downstream sectors its impact
on aggregate volatility is diminished due to this spread of shock over time.
Proposition 5: The network contribution to aggregate volatility is also lower for
UDR model:
NC0PD(y) > NC1PD(y) > NCUDR(y) (2.43)
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Proof: The result follows the proof as given in Proposition 2.
Since the aggregate volatility goes down in case of UDR model, it also has a neg-
ative impact on network contribution to aggregate volatility. The diversification
of the impact of period t shocks over time leads to smaller amplification of shocks
due to network. This in turn decreases the contribution of network structure to
aggregate volatility.
2.3.4 Asymptotic properties
Definition : Diffusion adjusted out-degree of a sector is the weighted out-degree






ji ∈ Γp (2.44)
The adjusted out-degree, dpi measures the contribution of sector i as an input for
period t production in other sectors which use input factors from period t − p.
This adjusted out-degree is closely related to the weighted out-degree measure, di:
dpi ≤ di ∀p, i (2.45)
P∑
p=1
dpi = di ∀i = 1, .., N (2.46)
So, in an economy populated by sectors with P different production horizons,
we would have P × N adjusted out-degree measures, dpi, corresponding to lag
p and sector i. The above two equations 2.45 and 2.46 follow directly from the
fact that input-output matrix Γ = Γ1 + .. + ΓP . Since dpi ≤ di, it highlights
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the fact that sector i can be a big input supplier in the whole economy, but if
sectors have different production horizons, on average the contribution of sector
i production in period t an an input to other sectors can be small in subsequent
periods. Thus unequal diffusion rate forces us to make the distinction between
weighted out-degree, di and adjusted out-degree, dpi.
Assumption 2(A2): The sectoral growth volatility is same across all sectors i.e.
σi = σ ∀i = 1, .., N .
The asymptotic results can be shown to hold for any general case where the sectoral
volatility σi are bounded above by a finite constant. Here I have considered a
simple case for illustration purpose, but can be extended as in Acemoglu et al
(2012). Given assumption 3 we can now write:
Proposition 6: Under A3 and considering first order-interconnections the volatil-
ity for different diffusion models can be given by:






















If a few sectors provide large fraction of input supplies in the economy, this asym-
metry between sectors can force the aggregate volatility to decay at a rate slower
than
√
n. As shown in Acemoglu et al (2012), a heavy tailed distribution for di is
enough to show that aggregate volatility decreases at a rate slower than the usual
diversification argument. This result is reiterated in equation 2.47, where the
zero-period output growth volatility is bounded below by average sum of squares
of weighted out-degree, di. In contrast for an economy with unequal diffusion
rates, the volatility has a different lower bound given by average sum of squares
of adjusted weighted out-degree, dpi.
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Thus the above proposition establishes the difference in asymptotic properties that
can arise depending on whether we consider shock diffusion in the economy or not.
Depending on the distribution of di and dpi, these two economies can have different
decay rates for aggregate volatility. So, when we take unequal diffusion rates for
different sectors into consideration it can possibly change the asymptotic properties
of aggregate volatility in the economy. Also given equation 2.46, we know that the
sum of dpi over p periods is equal di. Given sufficient difference in diffusion rates
across sectors, this could imply a substantial difference in distributions of di and
dpi. If dpi turns out to be not so heavy tailed, then sectoral shocks would fail to
generate aggregate volatility.
Another important implication of the above proposition is that input-output ma-
trix is no longer a sufficient statistic for characterizing the role of idiosyncratic
sectoral shocks in generating aggregate volatility. The aggregate volatility now
depends on dpi which in turn depends on both input-output structure and diffu-
sion rate across sectors. It is possible to get the empirical counterpart of the above
measure dpi. The input-output matrix is usually available from national accounts,
while lead time indicator can be used as a proxy for different production horizon
or diffusion rate of sectors. I would explore this empirical dimension in the future
version of this paper.
2.4 Application
In this section, I look at the structure of US economy and study whether we can
find some evidence for variable diffusion of shocks in the economy. The first part
provides preliminary evidence in this regard while the second section will look at
the implication of different diffusion rates in the economy.
2.4.1 Reaction to Lehmann Crisis
To highlight the different reaction times, we can look at the reaction rates of
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Figure 2.4: Movement of shipments plus inventory in different sectors to
Lehmann crisis
quick adjustment would react quickly to the shock and adjust their production
decisions. This would then be reflected in their shipment levels and inventory.
For this purpose, I use shipments and inventory data from Bureau of Economic
Analysis and plot the reaction of different sectors in the months following the
Lehmann crisis. The plots in figure 2.4 and figure 2.5 show the reaction times of
different sectors.
Figure 2.4 gives the reaction of shipments plus inventory for different sectors after
Lehmann went bankrupt in September 2008. The sum of shipments and inventory
is a proxy for production of the sector. The vertical line on the graph corresponds
to the cut-off month for Lehmann bankruptcy. The first thing to notice from
these graphs is that not all sectors reacted to this shock at the same rate. Some
sectors like consumer non-durables and petroleum and coal products reacted more
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Figure 2.5: Movement of shipments and inventory in different sectors to
Lehmann crisis
in the following three to four months. On the other hand, some other sectors
like consumer durables and capital goods took much longer to reach their lowest
output levels which happened in almost one year. This gives evidence for the fact
that shock propagation through the macro economy depends on sectoral diffusion
rates.
Although in the above plot, all the sectors start reacting to the shock more or
less at the same time but they still differ in their adjustment rate- some cut
down their production relatively quickly compared to others. This factor is not
captured in the model presented in the previous section but can be included in
a richer model with inventory which allows for some forward looking adjustment
by different sectors. But the plots in figure 2.4 need some more analysis about
sectoral shock propagation because the above plots actually show sectoral reaction
to an aggregate shock (Lehmann bankruptcy was a major event and triggered the
reactions on a national level). Since the reaction rates for different sectors are so
different for an aggregate level shock, we can expect that sectors would react with
different lags for TFP shock to an individual sector, the main assumption of this
paper.
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This fact becomes more clear when we look at the breakdown of inventory and
shipments in figure 2.5. The two sectors which stand out in this figure are capital
goods and household appliance manufacturing. Due to the shock their shipments
fall relatively quickly when compared to their inventory levels. Infact, the inven-
tory levels in these two sectors remain fairly constant for few months as compared
to other sectors which means these sectors did not rapidly cut down their produc-
tion levels, thus leading to an accumulation of inventory. It is only after six or
eight months that these sectors reduced their output levels enough to bring down
the levels of their inventory.
For most other sectors both inventory and shipments fall at the same rate. So, in
general shipments plus inventory seems a good proxy for sectoral prodution and
can potentially be used to quantify diffusion rates. But again what comes out of
this figure 2.5 is that sectors react differently to an aggregate shock. So in case of
a sectoral shock they would probably react even more slowly, which can be due to
lack of contemporaneous information about the shock or production frictions as
argued in the previous section.
2.4.2 Outdegree distribution
In this section, we do the same exercise as in Acemoglu et al(2012) and look at
the out-degree distribution in the context of US economy. The difference in this
case is that we also plot the out-degrees after accounting for different diffusion
rates of different sectors. The diffusion rates are proxied by lead time of different
sectors. Since the different sectors in economy have different production horizons,
there is a time lag between initialization and completion of production and this
is captured by lead time indicator. The different lead times for different sectors
can be inferred from the Figure 2.1 in the introduction. Unlike Acemoglu, here I
restrict my attention to the manufacturing sector of the US economy because I do
not have any lead time style proxy for other sectors.
I use the detailed benchmark input–output accounts from 2007, compiled by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis for the exercise in this section. BEA provides
commodity-by- commodity direct requirements tables, where the typical (ij) entry
captures the value of spending on commodity i per dollar of production of com-
modity j. As detailed above, I restrict my attention only to the manufacturing
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Figure 2.6: Distribution of diffusion adjusted out-degrees for different lead-
time cutoffs
sector which gives me 237 sectors that roughly correspond to four-digit NAICS
level.
As argued before, I use lead time as a proxy for diffusion rates of different sectors.
The lead time of different sectors is calculated by dividing unfulfilled orders by
value of shipments in a given month. I use the monthly average lead time value
over the period 1991-2008 for the calculations in this section. The lead time values
are not available at 4-digit level and I can only calculate it for 42 distinct sectors.
These 42 sectors are both at 3 or 4-digit NAICS level. This means that lead time
is not available at the same disaggregated level as input-output table which has
237 sectors. The 4-digit NAICS sectors in the direct requirements that do not
have a corresponding 4-digit lead time indicator, I assign them the lead time value
for 3-digit NAICS. This would give me similar diffusion rates for many sectors and
would thus lead to less differentiated diffusion rates on a finer sectoral level.
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Figure 2.6 shows the density plots of weighted out-degree for different diffusion
rates depending on how we split up the economy based on sectoral lead times.
The top-left panel in this figure corresponds to the case where we do not account
for different diffusion rates. It is similar to the case presented in other network
models like in Acemoglu et al(2012). The top right panel corresponds to dividing
sectors into two categories, those with lead time less than 26 weeks and others
with lead time more than 26 weeks. This gives us two different diffusion rates for
the sectors in this economy where the diffusion adjusted weighted out-degree are
calculated from Γ1 and Γ2 as in equation 2.38. The bottom left panel similarly
corresponds to the case when we split sectors by lead time cutoffs 12, 24, 36 and
above weeks. Finally, the bottom right panel corresponds to the case with bins
created using 4, 8, 12, 24 and above week slices of lead time.
What the results in the above graphs show is that once we start accounting for
differential diffusion rates, the sectors with very high weighted out-degree starts
to fall. This makes it difficult to generate heavy tailed distribution of the diffusion
adjusted weighted out-degree of these sectors. As compared to the top left panel
where the highest outdegree was roughly 15, the bottom right panel has the highest
out-degree of 8. What is more important is that the entire density shifts to the
left and thus making it even less likely to generate heavy-tailed distribution.
Another important point to notice here is that these plots are generated with
limited information in lead time values for many sectors. Since, the lead time data
was available for only 42 sectors, a lot of sectors get assigned to the same diffusion
bin corresponding to the parent NAICS level. Due to this problem a large number
of sectors are present in the first bin and hence inflate the diffusion adjusted
out-degrees to a certain level. But overall the diffusion mechanism decreases the
likelihood of generating a heavy tailed distribution of outdegrees and thus also
decreases the chances that a sectoral shock can generate aggregate fluctuations.
2.5 Sectoral shock decomposition
In this section, I do similar exercise as performed in Foerster, Sarte and Watson
(2012) and use factor methods to decompose the industrial production (IP) into
components arising from aggregate and sector specific shocks. I use structural
factor analysis and see how incorporation of diffusion channel into multi-sector
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growth model attenuates the contribution of sector specific shocks to aggregate
volatility.
2.5.1 Overview of the data
I use IP data for the years 1984-2007 for the analysis in this section. The data is
restricted to the above time period to keep the results comaparable to the exercise
performed in Foerster, Sarte and Watson (2012). The data corresponds to 3-digit
industry level NAICS classification and reported for 26 sectors. It is possible
to extend the analysis and use 117 sectors i.e. 4-digit industry classification as
in Foerster, Sarte and Watson (2012) instead of current 26 sectors but we are
restricted by data on lead time indicator as it is reported only at 3-digit level.
The IP data is reported on a monthly frequency level but we restrict ourselves
to quarterly level. The quarterly value for IP indices are constructed by taking
average over the monthly values in that quarter. IPt denotes the aggregate IP
value in time period t while IPit denotes the IP value for sector i in period t. We
will be working with growth rates of different sectors which are denoted by gt for
the aggregate IP and as xit at the sectoral level. The growth rates are then defined
by gt = 400× ln (IPt/IPt−1) and xit = 400× ln (IPit/IPit−1).
2.5.2 Setup: Factor Analysis
In this section, we perform both statistical as well as structural factor analysis to
decompose the aggregate fluctuations into aggregate and sectoral shocks. Let us
first begin with the statistical factor analysis. Let Xt denote the vector of sectoral
growth rates xit in period t, then the factor model can be written as:
Xt = ΛFt + ut (2.49)
where Ft is a k × 1 vector of latent factors, Λ is N × k matrix of factor loadings
and ut is N × 1 vector of sector specific idiosyncratic disturbances. As in classical
factor analysis Ft and ut are assumed to be mutually uncorrelated and i.i.d. with
a diagonal covariance matrix for ut. This allows us to express the covariance
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matrix of growth rates, Xt as ΣXX = ΛΣFFΛ
′ + ΣXX , where ΣFF and ΣXX are
covariance matrices of Ft and ut respectively. Since, by construction, ΣXX is
assumed to be diagonal, all covariance between different sectors is explained by
the common factos Ft. We can use principal components to consistently estimate
the factors as discussed in Stock and Watson (2000) and then use penalized least-
square criterion to further select the number of factors. In the current exercise, I
restrict the number of factors to two to simplify the analysis and deliver comparable
results. Although the results are similar if we use just one common factor.
Now having estimated the common factors, we can use them to construct a measure
for importance of aggregate shocks. We can define R2(F ) = w̄′ΛΣFFΛ
′w̄/σ2g as the
contribution of common factors to aggregate volatility where σ2g is the variance of
growth rate of aggregate IP. The above formula comes from the assumption that
aggregate growth rate gt ≃ w̄′Xt, where we have further assumed that sectoral
weights w̄, i.e. vector of contributions of sectors to overall IP, is constant over
time.
The above described statistical factor analysis misses one important point that
sectoral shocks can be amplified through sectoral linkages as shown in Long and
Plosser (1983), Horvath (1998), Carvalho (2007) and other related papers. What
this implies is that in the absence of a structural model, idiosyncratic sectoral
shocks amplified through inter-sectoral linkages would appear as common shocks
under statistical factor analysis. But we can use the structural models presented in
the Section 3 to separate the network contribution of sectoral shocks from common
shocks as done in Foerster, Sarte and Watson (2012).
We have to look at the one-period diffusion model or Long and Plosser (1983)
model for carrying out structural factor analysis. The sectoral growth rate Xt is
given by:
Xt = [I − (1− α)Γ1L]−1 εt (2.50)
Now, sectoral innovations εt consist of both aggregate as well as sectoral shocks,
given by:
εt = ΛSSt + νt (2.51)
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where St is a k × 1 vector of latent factors and correspond to aggregate shocks,
ΛS is N × k matrix of factor loadings while νt is N × 1 vector of sector spe-
cific idiosyncratic disturbances. We further assume that St and νt are mutually
uncorrelated and i.i.d and the idiosyncratic shocks, νt are uncorrelated i.e. the
covariance matrix Σνν is diagonal.
The evolution of sectoral output growth can now be expressed as a factor model:
Xt = Λ(L)Ft + ut (2.52)
where
Λ(L) = [I − (1− α)Γ1L]−1 ΛS (2.53)
and Ft = St, and
ut = [I − (1− α)Γ1L]−1 νt (2.54)
From the above equation, one can see that sectoral shocks are amplified through
inter-sectoral linkages captured by the term [I − (1− α)Γ1L]−1. Ignoring the
above term is the main reason for over-estimation of contribution of aggregate
shocks in aggregate volatility. To overcome this problem, one can apply factor
model to εt, instead of Xt. The only problem is that one does not observe εt but
it is possible to apply factor decomposition on its empirical counterpart given by:
εt = [I − (1− α)Γ1L]Xt (2.55)
A similar analysis as listed above is done in Foerster, Sarte and Watson (2012).
The additional exercise in this paper is is to perform a similar analysis for diffusion
adjusted model. In case of diffusion adjusted model, we decompose:
εt =
[







Table 2.1: Contribution Aggregate shocks
Data 1PD UDR
(1) (2) (3)
R2(S) 72% 63% 73%
2.5.3 Results
The results of the different models discussed above are presented in table 1. The
contribution of aggregate shocks is captured by the value R2(S). Column 1 cor-
responds to the case where we apply factor analysis to raw data. In this case, the
sectoral inter-linkages do not play any role and we see that common shocks have
a 72% contribution to overall volatility.
The second column in the same table corresponds to one period diffusion model
or Long and Plosser (1983) model. Since this model takes into account the inter-
sectoral linkages, the contribution of common shocks goes down and now only
contribute 63% to the aggregate volatility. Although, the contribution of common
shocks has gone down in this case but not as much as reported in Foerster, Sarte
and Watson (2012). The reason being that the shocks affect downstream sectors
one period later and hence attenuates some of the amplification mechanism present
in their paper.
The third column needs some explanation because I have used unequal diffusion
rate model in this case. I have divided the sectors into two- one with lead time
less than a quarter and another with lead time more than one quarter i.e. Γ is
split into Γ1 and Γ2. Then I applied factor method to decompose εt constructed
using the filter I− (1−α) [Γ1L+ Γ2L2]. In this case, the contribution of common
shocks goes up due to the fact that sectoral shocks affect few sectors in one time
period. To compensate this and achieve higher correlation between sectors, the
common shocks now need to be larger to achieve the same aggregate volatility.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper started out to explore the idea of shock diffusion in a multi-sector
economy. Using two canonical models, I showed how a lagged production function
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can be used to model shock diffusion in the context of a production economy.
I then showed that 1-period diffusion models generate less aggregate volatility
when compared to 0-period diffusion models that use contemporaneous production
linkages.
I then developed a more realistic diffusion model where different sectors have dif-
ferent production horizons and thus different diffusion rates. Under this setup,
I find that introduction of shock diffusion partially closes down the important
channel for shock amplification as present in the single period models with con-
temporaneous production linkages. Since different sectors have different shock
diffusion rates, the shock to sector i at time t affects different sectors at different
periods of time, thus reducing the impact of this shock on aggregate volatility in
any single period. I later use this model to pin down the asymptotic properties
of aggregate volatility as the number of sectors goes to infinity and again ask the
question- whether idiosyncratic sectoral shocks can generate aggregate volatility
in the economy after controlling for differential shock diffusion? The short answer
is yes, but with a much stricter requirement. The requirement is that the diffu-
sion adjusted weighted out-degree measure should have a heavy tailed distribution
where this adjusted weighted out-degree depends on both the network structure
and diffusion rates of different sectors.
In the end, the paper presents quantitative evidence to show that accounting for
diffusion channel reduces the importance of inter-sectoral networks in amplifying
idiosyncratic sectoral shocks. The contribution of sectoral shocks in aggregate
volatility is not as high as argued in some of the recent papers. This gives im-
portant reason to further examine the diffusion channel in greater detail as it will
have important implications for the direction of this literature.
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Appendix
Optimal quantities







Yit, ∀i = 1, 2, 3





Yjt, ∀i, j = 1, 2, 3









ijt−1 ∀i = 1
which gives:
y1t = µudr1 + (1− α) [γ11y1t−1 + γ12yt−2 + γ13yt−3] + ε1t
Chapter 3
Employment in a Network of
Input-Output Linkages
joint work with Francois de Soyres
Abstract
What is the consequence of a technological improvement in one sector on employment
in sectors located downstream in the supply-chain? On the one hand, if material and
labor are gross substitute in the production function, the price decrease for the former
tends to reduce labor demand for the latter per unit produced. On the other hand, the
upstream positive technological shock also increases the number of unit produced through
a decrease in the marginal cost. The net effect on employment simply depends on the ratio
between the elasticity of substitution in the production function and the price elasticity of
demand. We estimate those parameters at the sector level using detailed French data and
show that employment sensitivity of sectors following a decrease in their material input
price are very heterogeneous. Consequences for forecasting the effect of an increase in




Recent developments in the network literature have highlighted the important
role of input-output linkages in amplification of sector level shocks. In an inter-
connected economy, an increase in the efficiency of one sector yields benefits for all
other sectors, the magnitude of which depends on the detailed network structure.
While those sectoral spillovers are always positive when one looks at gross output
production, this is not necessarily the case for usage of one particular input such as
labor, or for value added production in general.1 Following a decrease in the price
of a material input, firms and sector re-optimize their input mix in production as
well as their production scale.
In this paper, we start by showing in a simple theoretical framework that the
consequence of a technological innovation for labor demand in downstream sectors
depends on two key elasticities: (i) the elasticity of substitution between labor
and material input and (ii) the price elasticity of demand. The first parameter
captures the change in the input mix due to a change in relative prices, while
the second captures the size of increased sales attracted by the sector following
the decrease in marginal cost. Indeed, if total sales is fixed, the employment
consequences of a decrease in the price of intermediate input depends solely on
the gross substitutability or complementarity between labor and material inputs
in the production function. However, when firms increase the share of the cheaper
input in their production basket, they also decrease their production costs and
hence their price, hereby attracting new customers. Such a change in the scale
of production counteracts the reduced labor share per unit produced, so that the
overall direction of labor demand is ambiguous. We show that the two elasticities
described above are the only parameters one needs to estimate in the data in order
to make prediction for employment changes.
We then exploit a very detailed dataset of French firms and estimate those elas-
ticities separately for each sector. Using a panel of French firms matched with
employee level data, we can estimate the value of those two parameters using
within firms variations and construct a value for the sector level elasticities. Fi-
nally, we put together our theoretical and empirical results together and compute
1Acemoglu and Restrepo (2016) study “the race between machine and man” and the con-
sequences of automation (which could be seen as a technological improvement in the sector
producing robots) for labor share.
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the degree of sensitivity of employment in each sector with respect to technological
improvements.
Our paper is related to several strands of literature on production networks. First,
on the theoretical side, after the seminal contribution by Long and Plosser (1983)
on business cycles in a network economy, many papers have been interested in
the sectoral origin of aggregate volatility in output, diluting the original “diversi-
fication” argument, according to which idiosyncratic sectoral or firm-level shocks
should wash out in the aggregate due to law of large numbers. Carvalho (2011),
Acemoglu et al. (2012) and others have provided necessary conditions under which
a networked economy with input-output linkages is able to amplify sectoral shocks
to create aggregate fluctuations. While many studies focus on volatility or gross
output, we are specifically interested in the employment consequences of techno-
logical shocks in the context of input-output linkages.
On the empirical side, Atalay (2015) and Foerster et al. (2011) have tried to
test the predictions of these theoretical models and estimate the contribution of
sectoral shocks to aggregate volatility. Giovanni et al. (2014) use detailed firm
level data from France for this decomposition exercise. More recently Barrot and
Sauvagnat (2016) use natural disaster as a proxy for firm level idiosyncratic shocks
to study the propagation of these shocks from one firm to another and understand
the impact on downstream output growth rates and spillovers.
Our paper is also closely related and contributes to the literature on estimating
production elasticities. Oberfield and Raval (2016) use cross-sectional firm level
balance sheet data to estimate sector level substitution elasticity in the production
function. In the absence of precise firm level efficiency wage information, they had
to use area level efficiency wages for their estimations. We improve upon their
methodology by using detailed firm level data which allows us estimation of firm
level efficiency wage, which can be directly used in the estimation of production
elasticity. There is another important contribution in the empirical section, which
is estimation of substitution elasticity between material inputs and capital-labor.
A large part of the previous literature has primarily focused on estimating substi-
tution elasticity between capital and labor but we document the other elasticity
as well. Our results highlight substantial heterogeneity in elasticity of substitution
between material inputs and capital-labor across sectors.
80
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we lay down
our theoretical framework and derive a prediction for the employment change
in a sector following a decrease in the price of its material input. This elasticity
depends on two key elasticities for which we derive estimation equations. In section
three, we present our dataset and empirical strategy and derive estimated value
for the production and the demand elasticities for many sector. We also present
consolidated result for sector’s sensibility to upstream shocks. Section four offers
concluding remarks and avenues for future research.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
This section develops a simple theoretical framework of firms and sectors employ-
ment decisions which forms the basis of our empirical work.
3.2.1 Basics
We consider a sector k populated by a large number of identical firms producing a
good Yk using three inputs: labor Lk, capital Kk and material inputs Mk bought
from other firms. Since all firms within sector k are symmetric, there is no need
for firm specific index and we simply write the generic production function for all





















k is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of labor and capital and ǫP > 0
is the elasticity of substitution between basic factors of production and material
inputs. µ is a weight that controls for the spending share of basic production fac-
tors vis-a-vis material input. As will be clear later, assuming that those weights
are constants means that we do not need to estimate them as we use time dif-
ferences in order to relate changes in relative input prices to changes in relative
input usage. Sector k faces an aggregate demand curve characterized by a price




where pk is the price of sector k’s good and ǫD is the price elasticity of demand.
We do not model further the demand side in the market for goods produced by
sector k but rather posit the existence of an aggregate demand function with a
(locally) constant price elasticity. Such demand can potentially come from other
industries of from final consumers. Sector k is monopolistic and choses its price in
order to maximize profit. Since it faces a demand with a constant price elasticity






µv1−ǫPk + (1− µ)q1−ǫPk
) 1
1−ǫP (3.3)
where MCk is the marginal production cost of sector k which is equal to the price
index dual to the CES aggregation in the production function (3.1). We denote



















Firms in sector k take input price as given and chose Lk, Kk and Mk in order
to maximize their profit, given the demand they are facing.2 We first model
the optimal choice of material input and the capital labor bundle and we will
characterize separately the demand for labor and capital below. In this context,
total profits in sector k are equal to total revenues minus total costs which can be
written:







k − vkVk − qkMk (3.6)
where we replace the price using the inverse demand curve (3.5), implying that


























2It is equivalent to solve the problem in two step, wherein the first step firms chose inputs to
minimize their production price and in a second step they chose their price to maximize profit.
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As is usual, firms use production inputs until the marginal revenue product as-
sociated with each input equals their price they are paying for those inputs. It
is apparent from the above equations that the price elasticity of demand is an
important parameter in shaping input demand, stemming from the fact that the
marginal revenue product associated with hiring an additional unit of any input
is governed by (i) the impact this additional input has on production cost and (ii)
the impact this change in marginal cost and hence on pricing has on final revenue.
Using the production function (3.1), we can have an expression for the partial


























Using this expression as well as the corresponding equation for ∂Yk
∂Mk
), we can
combine the first order conditions and obtain an expression of the ratio of basic











Note that we can also rewrite this equation in terms of factor payment rather than
quantity, which will prove useful when we estimate the elasticity of substitution












Finally, replacing vk by its expression in (3.4) and using the fact that total payment



















We want to get closed form solutions for the percentage changes of variables when
there is a positive technological shock in sector located upstream to sector k. In
our framework, such a shock would affect sector k’s input choice and sales through
its impact on the price of material input qk and ultimately on the marginal produc-
tion cost. Our goal is to show that the change in employment in sector k depends
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on two key elasticities, ǫP and ǫD, which we will then estimate for many sectors
using detailed French data.
We denote x̂ the percentage change of any variable x (x̂ = dx
x
= d log(x)). Starting
with the FOCs in sector k, we first substitute the expression of Yk using the
production function and then log-linearize (3.8) and obtain (assuming that D0, µ
and all elasticities are parameters that do not change): -2cm0cm
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and equivalently for sM . Combining the log linear trans-
formations of first order conditions yields the following expressions for V̂k:
V̂k =
ǫ2P





























We further assume that changes in wage and rental rate of capital are uncorrelated
to shocks to the price of material inputs.3 Taking the expectation over all possible
realizations of shocks to upstream sectors, the above expression then simplifies to:
EV̂k =
−ǫ2P





) · ǫP − 1
ǫP
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Furthermore, using the Cobb-Douglas nature of the K−L bundle, total spendings
on labor is simply equal to a share (1 − α) of total spendings for the bundle Vk.
In turn, this yields a simple relationship between proportional changes in Lk and
3This approach is similar to what is done in Amiti et al (2013). Alternatively, we could
assume that shocks to the price of material input are small and the rest of the economy is large
enough so that both wages and rental rate of capital are fixed exogenously. In such a case, we
would not need to take expectations to get rid of wages and rental rate changes.
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proportional changes in Vk:
wkLk = (1− α)vkVk =⇒ L̂k = V̂k
Finally, after rearranging and considering a positive technological shock upstream,
triggering a decrease in the associated price price q̂k = −1, the change in K and
L usage is given by:
L̂k =
















In our partial equilibrium analysis,4 a technological improvement in a sector k′
located upstream to k in the supply chain leads to an increase in employment in k
if and only if the elasticity of substitution between the K−L bundle and material
inputs ǫP is lower than the price elasticity of aggregate demand faced by sector
K, ǫD.
3.2.3 Numerical Explorations
In this section, we quantitatively investigate the consequences of varying the values
of the two key parameters: the demand elasticity ǫD and the production elasticity
ǫP . We consider the partial equilibrium model described above with a fixed wages
and rental rate of capital, and compute the value of the proportional change in
employment after a decrease in material price using equation (3.13). The graph
below plots the value of L̂k in the vertical axis as a function of both ǫP and ǫD.
We added in grey the reference surface defined by z = 0. We see that whenever
ǫD > ǫP , employment in sector k increases when the price of material input
decreases, even when labor is gross substitute with materials in the production
function.
4with fixed wages and rental rate of capital
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Figure 3.1: Numerical explorations for the elasticity of employment
When ǫP > 1, the K − L is gross substitute with materials in the production
function. A decrease in material price gives incentives to firms in sector k to
demand more material inputs relative to labor and capital for each unit produced
and the spending share of labor decreases which triggers a decrease in marginal
cost and hence in the price pk. Moreover, when ǫD > ǫP > 1, the decrease in
price leads to an increase in sales that more than overturns the decrease in labor
demand. Even though the share of spending devoted to labor decreases, total
spendings on all inputs increases more strongly so that the net effect is an increase
in total demand for labor. Hence, employment in sector k increases as a result of
the positive technological shock upstream. The result is obviously reversed when
ǫD < ǫP and the sales increase does not compensate the decrease in labor share,
resulting in a net decrease in employment.
When ǫP < 1, labor is gross complement with materials in the production function.
In such a case, the drop in material price triggers an increase in the labor and
capital share in spendings.
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3.2.4 Estimation Equations
Before presenting our empirical section, we simply lay down the estimation equa-
tions delivered by our theoretical framework. We start by presenting the equations
tat enable us to estimate the production elasticity in two different framework and
then turn to the demand elasticity.
Looking first at the nested CES production function described above, profit max-


















Taking the logarithm and considering differences over time within a firm in sector




















Alternatively, positing a production function in which labor and material inputs
are directly aggregated in a CES form (without a first step aggregating labor and
capital), firms’ optimization problem leads to a slightly different realtionship. In
particular, without aK−L bundle, the share of labor relative to capital disappears













Finally, in order to get an indirect measure of the price elasticity of demand, we







The consequence of positive technological shocks in sector i for any sector k located
downstream of i in the supply chain is governed by two key elasticities. The
goal of this section is to use detailed data on French firms in many industries in
order to estimate those elasticities at the sector level. We focus on manufacturing
sector corresponding to 1-digit level ”C” under NAF nomenclature used by French
statistical agency INSEE. This gives us 24 sectors at 2-digit level.
3.3.1 Data
There are two main sources of firm level datasets that we use for this exercise.
Our first source of firm level data is the BRN which comes from the French fiscal
administration.5 It contains balance-sheet information collected from the firms’
tax fillings as well as detailed information on the firms’ balance sheets, including
the value of total capital stock, the total wage bill, the average firm level wage rate.
Our dataset also contains the sectors and the region in which the firm operates
which is an important information given our estimation strategy.
We focus our analysis on the 7 years period stretching from 2003 to 2009 where
all variables are labeled in Euro (and not French Francs). Initially, the dataset
contains more than 500,000 firms per year. We get rid of firms employing less
than 5 employees, which reduces the sample to about 300,000 firms per year.6
The number of observation per year can be found in table 3.1 and the number of
observation per sector can be found in appendix, table ??. Sectors are unevenly
represented in our sample and some sectors contain a very low number of observa-
tion. We concentrate our analysis on sectors gathering at least 2,200 observations
in total and hence do not use sectors 11, 12, 19 and 30.
The second dataset is DADS (Déclaration annuelles de données sociales), which
collects matched employer-employee information and specifically wage informa-
tion, which is important for our analysis. The data is collected from mandatory
5BRN stands for Benefice Reel Normal, the normal tax regime for French firms.
6There are two reasons why we believe small firms should not be used in our estimation.
First, firms employing a small number of employees have a “discretionary problem” as adjusting
their labor force by one person can constitute a sizable adjustment in their total wage payment,
implying a non-continuous adjustment in their input mix. Second, small firms also experience a
higher average growth rate and might expand their input base in a non optimal way based on
recruitment opportunities.
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Table 3.1: Total Observations
All More than 5 employees More than 10 employees
2003 51, 424 49, 116 35, 345
2004 50, 977 48, 421 34, 476
2005 50, 081 47, 757 34, 034
2006 49, 187 46, 999 33, 573
2007 48, 100 45, 959 33, 004
2008 45, 560 42, 611 31, 722
Note: From BRN and DADS merge (Only NAF ”C” sectors)
reporting of gross earnings by each firm to the French tax authority. The DADS is
a subset of this income tax data, covering all individuals employed in French enter-
prises and who were born in October of even-numbered years. Each observation in
DADS dataset corresponds to a matched employer-employee pair and contains in-
formation like number of days worked, total wage, occupation and other employee
related information like age, sex etc. Each observation also contains employee
id which allows for matching an individual across years as well as firm identifier
(SIREN), which allows for matching DADS with BRN data. For the eight years
of our analysis, the resulting dataset has roughly 200 million matched employer-
employee observations.
In the end we merge the two sources of datasets, BRN and DADS, to get final
dataset with approximately 50, 000 observations per year as shown in table 3.1.
This is the final merged data we use for running firm level regressions to estimate
effect of wages on input choice of firms.
3.3.2 Estimation: Elasticity of substitution
In order to identify elasticity of substitution between various inputs of the firm we
use the log-linearized equation (3.14) and (3.15), which come from solving firm’s
profit maximization problem in the case of a nested CES or full CES production
function respectively. Accordingly, we will use two different specifications as base-
line estimates of elasticity of substitution. The first comes directly from equation
(3.14), which we call nested CES specification, where labor and capital as a bun-









= (1− ǫP )(1− αj) log (w)kjt + γk + δt + CONTROLS + ǫkjt
(3.16)
where LHS of equation (3.16) gives the ratio of capital and labor spending to
intermediates for firm k in sector j at time t. The variable of interest here is the
regression coefficient on firm level wage wkjt. The wage used here is the efficiency
wage for the firm after controlling for observable measures of skill and worker
level characteristics. To estimate the efficiency wage for each firm we use matched
employer-employee DADS data to construct residual wage for the the firms. 7
Since, we have firm level panel we can control for firm level heterogeneity by
using firm fixed effects γk. The time fixed effects δt allow us to control for yearly
variations across all firms. Lastly, all the regressions that we report controls for
firm level variables like age, region, number of employees etc. It is important to
note here that we are using firm level data here instead of plant level data because
BRN reports capital and intermediate usage at the firm level and not plant level.
The identification in the above equation comes from exploiting the changes in
within firm wages as well as across firms over time. Since we have observations
for the same firm over multiple periods, we can get rid of bias coming from firm
level skill differences or other observable and non-observable factors. Also, this
specification allows for firms to have different rental rates of capital which will be
captured by firm fixed effects γk, under the assumption that this rental rate does
not change over time for a given firm.
As a second baseline, we use full (non-nested) CES specification, where capital,
labor and intermediates enter the same CES production function with same elas-
ticity of substitution ǫP across the three inputs. Log-linearizing profit maximizing








= −(1− ǫP ) log (w)kjt + γk + δt + CONTROLS + ǫkjt (3.17)
7The details of residual wage construction are given in Appendix B.
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where equation (3.17) is similar to (3.16) with the only difference in LHS com-
ing due to different specification for the production function. The identification
strategy in this non-nested case is similar to the one used for nested production
function. Since we are interested in difference between ǫP across different sectors,
we run the above regressions separately for all 2-digit sectors belonging to the ”C”
category, under 1-digit NAF industry classification. The results of our regressions
are reported in the next sub section.
Using the French firm level dataset has many advantages and helps us overcome
many of the problems persistent with the estimation of production elasticities.
Firstly, it gives us information on matched employer-employee data with detailed
worker characteristics. This helps us filter out skill and other worker level differ-
ences and get precise residuals at the firm level to calculate efficiency wage. Also,
since we can match this information with balance sheet data of firms, we can run
regressions as stated in equations (3.16) and (3.17) with firm level wages. Other-
wise, the lack of individual worker level wage information in balance sheet data
does not allow for precise measurement of efficiency wage. So, unlike Oberfield
and Raval (2016) who use area level efficiency wage to circumvent this problem,
we can directly use efficiency wage at firm level. Our approach thus improves upon
their estimation method because we use precise firm level information rather than
aggregated area level wages. Secondly, the panel dimension of the dataset allows
us to control for individual firm level unobservable heterogeneity. Having firm
fixed effects thus allows us to control for differential rental rate of capital across
firms and thus we do not have to make strict assumption that capital is completely
mobile across firms as in the case of Oberfield and Raval (2016). Thirdly, since
we do not use area level wages in our primary regression, we can also control for
regional heterogeneity. Oberfield and Raval (2016) instead had to use an IV to
control for this regional heterogeneity. In our case, on the other hand we can al-
ready control for regional heterogeneity in firm location choice by including region
fixed effects.
Endogeneity
The equations (3.16) and (3.17) allow us to estimate firm level elasticity of sub-
stitution using both within and across firm variation in wages over time. Since
we have a panel dimension it allows us to control for firm level unobserved char-
acteristics but there are various sources for endogeniety bias in these regressions.
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For example- due to adjustments costs to capital or labor, firm’s input choices can
deviate from the static cost minimization problem which can also have an impact
on the efficient wages paid by the firm.
To solve potential endogeneity bias, we follow the approach developed in Oberfield
and Raval (2016) and use area level efficiency wages instead of firm level wages.
Since most firms are small and cannot impact area level wages, using area level
wages corrects for the bias arising from firm’s deviation from its cost minimization
problem as area level wages will be orthogonal to such deviation. Having said
that, it is important to highlight that such bias in our case is much smaller than
in case of Oberfield and Raval (2016). Indeed, the panel dimension of our dataset
allows us to control for any time invariant firm level unobserved heterogeneity
through firm fixed effects. Moreover, since Oberfield and Raval (2016) use a single
cross-section of area level wages, they could not control for regional differences
using region fixed effects. In our case, having access to a panel provides significant
improvements regarding such problems.
As a robustness check for our OLS results, we thus run two more specifications for
each of the nested and non-nested CES case. The first specification is similar to
Oberfield and Raval (2016) where we use area level efficiency wage wjt in equations
(3.16) and (3.17) instead of firm level wage wkjt.
8 As a second robustness check,
we use area level wage wjt as an instrument for firm level wage wkjt. The area level
wage wjt satisfies both the conditions necessary for being a good instrument. One,
it is highly correlated with firm level efficiency wages once filtering out individual
worker level characteristics and other skill level differences. Two, it also satisfies
the exclusion restriction since using the panel dimension allows us to capture effects
like firm location choice through firm fixed effect and hence error terms are much
less likely to be correlated with the instrument.
Estimation Results
Overall, we report three different estimates for each of the two cases corresponding
to the nested and non-nested estimation equations (3.16) and (3.17).
1. The first set of estimates is called OLS and correspond to a set of panel re-
gressions for each sector with firm and year fixed effects for equations (3.16)
8The area level wages are constructed by taking average across the residuals, across all workers
in a given area, from the wage equation.
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and (3.17). In this case we use firm level wages as independent variable in the
right hand side of the equations.
2. The second set of estimates is called Area and it corresponds to the estimates
similar to the ones reported in Oberfield and Raval (2016). Here, instead of
using firm level wages, we use area level wages, computed by taking average
wage over all firms in a given area. Oberfield and Raval argue that such a
specification is attractive because firms may find it costly to adjust capital or
labor. Deviations of a firm’s capital or labor from static cost minimization due
to adjustment costs would then be in the residual, but should be orthogonal
to the area level wage rate.
3. The third set of estimates is called IV. In this case, we use area level wages as
an instrument for firm level wages.
The point estimates for different sectors in each of these six cases (2 production
function assumption × 3 empirical specification for wages) are reported in table
3.4. Interestingly, there is very large heterogeneity across sectors for these point
estimates. Moreover, point estimates and resulting elasticities are quite sensitive to
the estimation procedure as well as the assumption about the production function.
Calculation: Elasticity of substitution in production
Equipped with these point estimates PEj as reported in table 3.4 as well as the
value of capital share αj as reported in table 3.2 for each sector j, we back out the
value of the elasticity of substitution in production for each sector. First, assuming
a full CES aggregation of all factors of production in the production function,9
the elasticity of substitution is simply given by
ǫP,j = 1− PEj (3.18)
with the variance of ǫP,j and PEj being equal. Moreover, positing a nested CES






9Meaning that there is no K − L bundle that is aggregated as a first step.
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Figure 3.2: Production Elasticity for 10 2-digits sectors
Non-Nested Production, OLS
We then need to compute standard deviation for this variable. For a ratio R =
X/Y where X and Y are independent variables, we use the following formula10 to
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Y 4
Hence, noting σα,i and σPE,i the standard errors of αi and PEi respectively, the









As a result, our OLS estimates for the production elasticity are presented in graph
??. The first important result to notice here is that sectors are fairly heterogeneous
in their elasticity of substitution. Second, many sectors feature a gross substitu-
tion between labor and material inputs with a value for the elasticity above one
as is apparent from the graph. These two features together imply that sectors
are heterogeneous in their response to shocks to material inputs. Interestingly,
imposing a full CES functional form or a nested CES one (where capital and labor
are first aggregated into a K-L bundle which is then combined in a second CES
form to material input) yields different results.
10See in “Sampeling Techniques”, 3rd Ed. by Cochrane (1977), page 183 for a proof
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Figure 3.3: Production Elasticity for 10 2-digits sectors
Nested Production, OLS
Figure 3.4: Price Elasticity of Demand for 20 2-digits sectors
3.3.3 Estimation: Price elasticity of demand
To estimate the demand elasticity faced by each sector, we assume optimal price
setting behavior under monopolistic competition where firms maximize their prof-
its. Under this assumption, the markup of the firm is given in terms of its demand
elasticity as ǫD/(ǫD − 1). We estimate the markup across sector by ratio of firm
level revenue to cost averaged across all firms in a given sector. To do this we
only take firms whose markup lies in (1, 2) and ignore the outliers. The results
of this exercise are shown in figure 3.4 and table 3.5. Most of the sectors have a
demand elasticity between 4 and 5. This way of measuring demand elasticity is in
line with other recent work in the literature.
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3.4 Sectoral sensitivity to upstream shocks
The sensitivity of employment in sector i with respect to a shock to any sector k
located upstream in the supply chain is governed by equation (3.13). As exposed
in proposition 1, a positive shock upstream leads to an increase in employment in




Panel Fixed Effects Regressions
In figures 3.5 and 3.6, we present our estimates of the above ratio for 10 sectors,
revealing that the level of this employment elasticity is not constant across sectors
under both the baseline estimates of nested and non-nested production function.
In terms of direction, our OLS estimation yields the prediction that all sectors
would increase employment following a positive technological shock upstream.11
This results stems primarily from the fact that the demand elasticity for most
of these sectors lie between 4 and 5 which implies a significatnt increase in the
production scale for associated with a decrease in price and marginal cost.
In terms of magnitude, however, sectors present significant differences. The chem-
ical industry (sector 20) presents a higher ratio of elasticity in the production
function to price elasticity of demand than other industries, revealing a lower em-
ployment reaction. On the other hand, the leather and shoes industry (sector 15)
or the wood industry (sector 16) seems to be particularly sensitive to upstream
technological shock with an employment reaction associated with upstream tech-
nological shock significantly higher than other industries.
Panel with Area Level wages
Using area level wages in lieu of firm level wages has a significant impact on the
results, as presented in figure 3.7 for the non nested case and 3.8 for the case of
a nested CES production function. In particular, the nested CES case feature
several industries with a ratio of elasticities high enough that the threshold value
of one lies in the confidence interval. According to our results, the chemical (sector
11Note that this is no longer true in our other specifications where we use area-level wages,
see below
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Figure 3.5: Ratios of production elasticity to demand elasticity
Non Nested Production, OLS
Figure 3.6: Ratios of production elasticity to demand elasticity
Nested Production, OLS
Figure 3.7: Ratios of production elasticity to demand elasticity
Non Nested Production, Area
20) and metallurgy (sector 24) industries would then decrease their employment
in response to a positive shock in the upstream sector.
Panel with Area Level wages as Instruments
Finally, figures 3.9 and 3.10 present our estimated ratio of elasticities when the
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Figure 3.8: Ratios of production elasticity to demand elasticity
Nested Production, Area
Figure 3.9: Ratios of production elasticity to demand elasticity
Non Nested Production, IV
elasticity of substitution in the production function is computed using area level
wages as instruments. The result is even more striking in this case as the ratio
can take values as low as 0.1 for the clothing industry (sector 14) and as high as
1.2 for the chemical industry (sector 20). Those differences illustrate the fact that
assuming identical production and demand elasticities across industries can po-
tentially impose an important bias on the sensitivity of several sectors to upstream
technological shocks.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper adds to our understanding on propagation of shocks within the network
of interconnected sectors. In contrast to other papers in the literature, we highlight
how a positive shock in an upstream sector does not always result in hiring more
labor in downstream sectors. Using a theoretical model of production with labor,
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Figure 3.10: Ratios of production elasticity to demand elasticity
Nested Production, IV
capital and material inputs, we show that the labor response can be summarized by
the combination of two crucial elasticities, overall demand elasticity and elasticity
of substitution in production, for a given sector.
Using detailed firm level data on French firms, we then estimate these elasticities
separately for different industrial sectors. We find a high degree of heterogeneity
across sectors for both demand and production elasticities. Interestingly, some
sectors feature production elasticities that are high enough that a positive shock
in an upstream sector would lead to a decrease in their labor usage. Intuitively,
a decrease in the price of material inputs relative to labor triggers an important
shift in the optimal input mix chosen by firms in those sectors, depressing labor
demand for each unit produced. The associated increase in sales (due to a price
decrease) and production is not large enough to compensate this negative force,
leading to an overall decrease in employment while total revenues and gross output
increase.
Using micro data on French firms in many industrial sectors allows us to take
a highly disaggregated view and reveals a high degree of heterogeneity in both
production and demand elasticities, leading to different sectoral responses to tech-
nological shocks. Such a result sheds a new light on the important debate on the
consequences of automation and the digital revolution.12 Abstracting for changes
in the demand side of the economy, an increase in the relative efficiency of ma-
chines compare to labor would trigger different consequences across sectors. While
textile, chemical or metallurgy might increase employment due to a strong reaction
in the production scale, others would experience a contraction of labor usage.
12This theme is an important part of the 2017 French presidential campaign. See the excellent
book “Le Monde est Clos et le Desir Infini” by Daniel Cohen for an analysis on this phenomenon.
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The log-linear transformation of the first order condition with respect to Vk in
firms’ profit maximization can be written -2cm0cm
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In this appendix, we relax the assumption of Cobb-Douglas aggregation between




































This section describes the calculation of wage residuals used in the main regressions
throughout the paper. The wage residuals are generated by using DADS matched
employer-employee dataset as described in detail in the data section. The DADS
gives information on wages as well as other characteristics such as age, gender,
occupation etc. of the individual in a given year.
The first step is to estimate a wage equation before aggregating the residuals at
the firm or area level. We use the following regression to filter out the different
effects:
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logwikjt = CONTROLS +Oi + Fk +Rikj + ǫikjt (3.23)
where we control for various individual level characteristics. Also, we control for
occupation Oi of the individual to filter out the skill bias, as well as firm fixed
effects Fk and region dummies Rikj.
After running the above regression, we filter out the residuals to be further used
in regressions reported in table 2. We back out the individual level residuals and
then calculate average wage residual for each firm by averaging across workers
from same firm. Similarly, for area level wage residual we average over all workers
in a given geographical area.
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Table 3.2: Capital share αj for different sectors


























Table 3.3: Point estimates from regressions in equations (3.16) and (3.17)
Non-nested Nested
Sector (OLS) (Area) (IV) (OLS) (Area) (IV)
10 -0.16*** -0.04 -0.47 0.05 0.75** 3.71*
(0.020) (0.181) (0.950) (0.028) (0.255) (1.749)
11 -0.263*** -0.28 -0.88 0.26* -0.63 -0.86
(0.082) (0.861) (1.109) (0.111) (1.144) (1.507)
12 -1.11 19.27 -11.86 0.41 -22.32* 14.12
(1.191) (10.26) (25.16) (1.030) (7.571) (31.12)
13 -0.03 -1.74** -7.66 -0.18* 1.37* 6.41
(0.046) (0.556) (6.068) (0.057) (0.672) (5.681)
14 -0.06 0.69 0.84 0.00 -1.23* -1.46
(0.055) (0.568) (0873) (0.061) (0.620) (1.006)
15 -0.06 0.80 -1.48 0.01 -1.43 -0.54
(0.098) (0.992) (3.285) (0.114) (1.145) (3.613)
16 -0.11*** -0.74* -1.90 0.00 1.07* 3.34
(0.039) (0.353) (1.700) (0.047) (0.423) (2.372)
17 -0.127** 0.05 0.30 0.17** -.29 -1.08
(0.048) (0.476) (1.481) (0.063) (0.617) (2.019)
18 -0.08** 0.30 0.63 0.03 0.33 0.44
(0.028) (0.298) (0.452) (0.036) (0.380) (0.568)
19 0.98* 4.09 10.29 1.01* 6.81 14.00
(0.417) (4.726) (15.07) (0.482) (5.128) (20.07)
20 -0.11* 0.47 1.22 -0.10 0.45 1.33
(0.04) (0.551) (1.774) (0.065) (0.730) (2.323)
21 -0.24** -0.71 12.44 0.26 3.42 -35.67
(0.118) (1.124) (32.33) (0.151) (1.433) (87.62)
22 -0.03 0.71* 1.18 -0.04 -0.48 -0.33
(0.029) (0.304) (0.700) (0.040) (0.404) (0.881)
23 -.02 0.51 0.99 -0.04 -0.38 -0.46
(0.053) (0.505) (1.020) (0.067) (0.645) (1.278)
24 -0.09 0.94 0.80 -0.14 -2.09* -1.92*
(0.06) (0.658) (0.713) (0.086) (0.848) (0.949)
25 -0.01 0.53** 1.40** -0.06** -0.40* -1.12*
(0.018) 0.177) (0.505) (0.020) (0.200) (0.548)
26 -0.05 -0.86 -0.72 0.02 0.54 -0.24
(0.052) (0.590) (0.923) (0.061) (0.689) (1.071)
27 0.12* -0.21 -0.38 -0.29*** 0.45 0.87
(0.050) (0.553) (1.067) (0.060) (0.641) (1.305)
28 0.02 0.04 0.46 -0.17*** 0.00 -0.50
(0.03) (0.300) (0.775) (0.035) (0.351) (0.905)
29 -.09 0.58 6.68 -0.01 -0.95 -8.75
(0.059) (0.592) (15.42) (0.070) (0.690) (18.15)
30 -0.03 1.89 1.93 -0.21 -0.14 0.23
(0.111) (1.147) (1.691) (0.134) (1.391) (1.870)
31 -0.06 0.57 39.17 -0.04 0.49 14.35
(0.042) (0.402) (227.6) (0.051) (0.473) (86.76)
32 -0.06 -0.20 -2.12 -0.02 0.49 5.21
(0.036) (0.394) (5.034) (0.044) (0.466) (9.048)
33 0.03 0.35 0.95 -0.07* -0.16 -0.77
(0.028) (0.290) (0.578) (0.031) (0.314) (0.626)
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Table 3.4: Number of observations in above regressions
Sector (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
10 30085 37,326 30,084 30,890 37,331 30,089
11 1841 2,126 1,841 1,842 2,127 1,842
12 22 23 22 22 23 22
13 7,417 8,411 7,417 7,418 8,412 7,418
14 6,771 8,014 6,771 6,772 8,015 6,772
15 2,285 2,617 2,285 2,286 2,618 2,286
16 7,679 9,503 7,679 7,685 9,509 7,685
17 5,157 5,766 5,157 5,159 5,768 5,159
18 13,077 15,935 13,077 13,081 15,939 13,081
19 263 272 263 263 272 263
20 6,941 7,631 6,941 6,941 7,631 6,941
21 1,799 1,907 1,799 1,799 1,907 1,799
22 13,660 15,349 13,660 13,662 15,351 13,662
23 9,410 11,102 9,410 9,413 11,105 9,413
24 3,400 3,667 3,399 3,400 3,667 3,399
25 42,566 50,550 42,565 42,573 50,557 42,572
26 7,155 8,214 7,154 7,158 8,217 7,157
27 5,616 6,322 5,616 5,617 6,323 5,617
28 16,044 18,570 16,044 16,047 18,574 16,047
29 4,880 5,504 4,880 4,882 5,506 4,882
30 2,103 2,415 2,103 2,103 2,415 2,103
31 7,277 8,741 7,277 7,278 8,742 7,278
32 7,907 9,628 7,909 7,907 9,628 7,907
33 20,474 24,870 20,473 20,479 24,876 20,478
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Table 3.5: Demand Elasticity ǫD
Sector Markup(Mean) Markup(SD) ǫD(Mean) ǫD(SD)
10 1.24 0.15 5.16 3.28
13 1.25 0.15 5.00 3.05
14 1.23 0.14 5.34 3.31
15 1.25 0.14 5.00 2.85
16 1.23 0.12 5.34 2.83
17 1.23 0.13 5.34 3.07
18 1.28 0.14 4.57 2.33
20 1.25 0.16 5.00 3.26
21 1.33 0.19 4.03 2.39
22 1.24 0.13 5.16 2.85
23 1.27 0.14 4.70 2.49
24 1.23 0.13 5.34 3.07
25 1.29 0.14 4.44 2.20
26 1.3 0.17 4.33 2.52
27 1.26 0.14 4.84 2.66
28 1.25 0.13 5.00 2.65
29 1.21 0.12 5.76 3.34
31 1.23 0.11 5.34 2.60
32 1.32 0.18 4.12 2.38
33 1.26 0.13 4.84 2.47
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Table 3.6: Sector codes under NAF 1-digit ”C”
Sector Code Sector Name
10 Industries alimentaires
11 Fabrication de boissons
12 Fabrication de produits à base de tabac
13 Fabrication de textiles
14 Industrie de l’habillement
15 Industrie du cuir et de la chaussure
16 Travail du bois et fabrication d’articles en bois
et en liège, à l’exception des meubles;
17 Industrie du papier et du carton
18 Imprimerie et reproduction d’enregistrements
19 Cokéfaction et raffinage
20 Industrie chimique
21 Industrie pharmaceutique
22 Fabrication de produits en caoutchouc et en plastique
23 Fabrication d’autres produits minéraux non métalliques
24 Métallurgie
25 Fabrication de produits métalliques,
à l’exception des machines et des équipements
26 Fabrication de produits informatiques, électroniques et optiques
27 Fabrication d’équipements électriques
28 Fabrication de machines et équipements n.c.a.
29 Industrie automobile
30 Fabrication d’autres matériels de transport
31 Fabrication de meubles
32 Autres industries manufacturières
33 Réparation et installation de machines et d’équipements
